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ABSTRACT 
	   	  
 Psychological essentialism is the widespread belief that members of natural and social 
categories share deep, physical properties, or “essences,” that cause their common observable 
characteristics, as well as their identity as category members (e.g., a Chihuahua “essence” causes 
it to be Chihuahua). The tendency to essentialize is pervasive; it has been documented in children 
and adults, as well as a number of different cultures (see Gelman, 2003, for a review). However, 
there is still much to learn about the development of essentialism. What are the origins of 
essentialist thought? This question remains challenging to answer, particularly because 
researchers have yet to determine a precise way to measure the belief in a causally powerful 
essence. The present research had two goals: 1) to refine and validate essentialism measures in 
order to more accurately capture the belief in a causal essence, and 2) to use these measures to 
test a possible precursor to essentialist reasoning as a step toward uncovering the origins of 
essentialist thought.  
 In Study 1, I adapted measures from the essentialism literature that seemed to best 
capture the belief in a causally powerful essence. I refined these measures to develop a more 
precise test of essentialist beliefs. The findings from this study adequately validate my revised 
measures: 5- to 7-year-old children and adults show developmentally normative essentialist 
beliefs, in line with previous work. These measures may be useful for researchers interested in 
examining essentialist beliefs in young children. In Studies 2 and 3, I tested a possible precursor 
to essentialist beliefs—namely the domain-general bias to explain via inherent information 
(Cimpian & Salomon, 2014). Previous work shows that essentialist beliefs do not emerge until 
the age of four. Thus, if inherent thinking is a precursor to essentialism, it should be present 
before essentialism, perhaps at age three. Using my revised measures, I tested the presence of 
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essentialism and inherent thinking in three-year-old children. My findings indicate that three-
year-old children have yet to develop the belief in a causal essence. However, these children do 
show early signs of inherent thinking. Overall, these studies suggest that a bias in explanation 
(i.e., the inherence heuristic) may precede essentialism. This research takes us one step closer 
toward understanding the developmental course of essentialist beliefs.   	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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 “Are you a geek like my mom, or do you like to party?” A seven-year-old boy visiting 
the lab asked me this question during my first year of graduate school. “My mom says to be 
successful, you need to be a geek and not a partier,” he added. Flustered as his mom watched me, 
I said “Well, I’m a graduate student, so I guess I’m a geek.” Aside from being hilarious, this 
child’s question—and his mom’s advice— represent a common element of human reasoning: the 
tendency to group people and things into discrete categories. This child assumed, like many 
children and adults do, that knowing whether I was a geek or a partier would tell him something 
about my character, personality, or ability to be successful. He also thought that “geeks” and 
“partiers” were mutually exclusive social categories—you could be one or the other, but not 
both.1 Categorizing in this way is a pervasive psychological phenomenon—one that considerably 
shapes human concepts across the lifespan. Essentialism, as it is commonly known, is the belief 
that categories share an unseen, but causally powerful, “essence” that reflects something deep 
and informative about their members (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Gelman, 2003; Kinzler & 
Dautel, 2012; Medin & Ortony, 1989). Scholars from different disciplines have discussed the 
tendency to essentialize, and it has also been studied in various cultures (Birnbaum, Deeb, 
Segall, Ben-Eliyahu, & Diesendruck, 2010; Gelman, Meyer, & Noles, 2013; Rhodes & Gelman, 
2009a) and at different points throughout the lifespan (Gelman, Heyman, & Legare, 2007).  
 Despite its established place in intellectual dialogue, however, there are many remaining 
questions about the development of essentialist thought. Where does essentialism come from? 
Although researchers have speculated on this issue (e.g., Gelman, 2003; Gelman & Hirschfeld, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The author does not think geeks and partiers are mutually exclusive categories.  
2 There is arguably no evidence that true, predictive “essences” exist in the world (see Keil, 1995; Leslie, 2013 for 
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1999), it remains a challenging question to answer. In the literature, conceptions of essentialism 
often differ from study to study (see Gelman, 2003, for a review). As a result, many different 
methods have been developed to study essentialism, particularly in early childhood. Findings 
across a range of procedures point to the robustness of essentialist reasoning—yet, different 
methods may also be open to different interpretations, making it difficult to develop a clear-cut 
way of examining precisely how or when essentialism develops. Thus, I have set out to 
accomplish two goals in the present research. First, I refined and validated essentialism measures 
in order to more accurately capture the belief in a causal essence. Second, I used these measures 
to test a possible precursor to essentialist reasoning; understanding the processes or biases that 
predate essentialism is an important step toward uncovering the origins of essentialist thought.  
 Before providing details about the current project, I first clarify my approach to defining 
and studying essentialism by analyzing previous literature on this topic. 
Defining and Measuring Essentialism 
 Different scholars define essences differently (for a review, see Gelman & Hirschfeld, 
1999). For my purposes, an essence is an underlying structure or quality, shared by members of a 
category, that reflects an individual’s true (categorical) nature and that causes the similarities 
shared by individual category members (James, 1890/1983; Locke, 1671/1959; Medin, 1989). 
Such an underlying structure is not seen or observed directly, but gives a category member its 
identity and remains unchanged through growth and development. The presumed physical 
qualities of an essence may vary and will depend on the domain being considered. In the domain 
of biology, the presumed essence might be something like DNA—a baby human will undergo 
drastic change and growth as it develops into an adult human, but its DNA will remain 
unchanged.  
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 Here, I am concerned with essentialism as an intuitive folk theory (that is, as a belief 
about the world), not as a metaphysical claim about the world per se. Whether essences actually 
exist in the world is irrelevant to the current research2; people believe that they do. These beliefs 
may be nonspecific—a person could have the intuition that an essence exists, without knowing 
the form or location of the essence (see R. Gelman, 1990; Keil, 1989; Medin & Ortony, 1989; 
Wellman, 1990). For example, a child could believe that “mommies” have some inner core that 
make them distinct from “daddies,” without having detailed knowledge about any biological 
differences between women and men. Indeed, folk beliefs about essences are usually vague and 
implicit, but still inform how people reason about categories.  
 In order to examine such implicit beliefs empirically, researchers assume that a typical 
“essentialist” believes:  
 1) that certain categories are “natural kinds”—that is, they are discoverable in nature, 
rather than invented—and have clusters of correlated properties (known as the kind assumption), 
and 
 2) that an unobservable property or feature (i.e., the essence) causes the observed 
similarities among same-category members (the essence assumption; e.g., Gelman, 2003; 
Haslam et al., 2000; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Newman & Keil, 2008; Prentice & Miller, 2007; 
Rhodes & Gelman, 2009a; 2009b; see also Bloom, 2000).  
 These assumptions provide a useful framework for investigating children and adults’ 
tendency to essentialize. Young children do not have the word “essence” in their vocabulary, 
and, as mentioned earlier, people’s beliefs about essences are generally vague and abstract 
(Medin & Ortony, 1989). Thus, instead of asking children and adults whether they believe in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 There is arguably no evidence that true, predictive “essences” exist in the world (see Keil, 1995; Leslie, 2013 for 
an extended argument). 
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causal essence per se, essentialist beliefs are typically examined by measuring downstream or 
related intuitions that may follow from the belief in an essence. Some of these intuitions reflect 
the kind assumption, whereas others reflect the essence assumption. One common measure of 
essentialism, for example, involves people’s inductive inferences about categories—that is, 
whether people generalize a property from one category member to another, over and above 
perceptual similarities (e.g., Carey, 1985; Gelman & Markman, 1986; Gelman, Collman & 
Maccoby, 1986; Gelman & Coley, 1990; Markman, 1989). Measures of inductive potential most 
accurately capture the kind assumption: in order to infer one category member’s properties from 
another, one must at least understand that categories are richly structured and share qualities 
beyond surface similarities. Tasks such as these do not necessarily reflect the essence 
assumption—one could understand that members of a kind will share fundamental qualities, 
without believing that these qualities are caused by a physical essence (see Gelman, 2003 for 
argument). In contrast, methods that more closely tap into the essence assumption typically rely 
on people’s beliefs about hidden, nonobvious features and their causal importance for categories. 
Such approaches typically measure whether people believe category membership is innate 
(Gelman & Wellman, 1991; R. Gelman, 1990; Springer & Keil, 1989), stable over change and 
growth (Rosengren et al., 1991), and whether people believe that category boundaries are rigid 
vs. fluid (Kalish, 1995; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009a; 2009b).  
 Unfortunately, the literature is not always clear about which assumption is under 
consideration (i.e., kind vs. essence). Moreover, measures of each assumption are used 
interchangeably to study a vast array of essentialist-like reasoning (see Gelman, 2004). People’s 
beliefs about categories vary largely by domain, and some categories are essentialized more than 
others (e.g., Diesendruck & Gelman, 1999; Gelman, 1988; Gelman & Gottfried, 1996). In order 
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to truly understand the nature and complexities of people’s concepts, a clear agreement on what 
is being tested is important.  
 How should researchers approach measurement development when it comes to 
essentialist reasoning? One could argue that testing the essence assumption (vs. the kind 
assumption) more accurately captures the general notion of essentialism as a psychological 
construct. The essence assumption naturally incorporates the kind assumption—the belief in a 
causal essence includes the belief in richly structured categories (see Gelman, 2003; Gelman, 
2004). In contrast, people can believe that category members share many commonalities without 
considering a causal basis for categories at all. In this way, one may pass the kind assumption 
criteria without passing the essence assumption criteria. However, measures should be designed 
to capture whatever aspect of essentialism is of interest. In the present research, I investigate 
people’s beliefs about a causal, physical essence (and develop measures to do so)—above and 
beyond the belief that categories have deep commonalities (Goal 1 and Goal 2). Thus, the studies 
presented will focus on the essence assumption.  
Measuring Essentialism: Strengths and Ambiguities 
 Although defining and measuring essentialism is a challenge, researchers have 
approached the topic in a number of creative ways. In this section, I describe and review a select 
group of measures from the essentialism literature that seem most suited to capture the belief in a 
causal essence (i.e., they test the essence assumption). These measures come closest to assessing 
the assumption that hidden, nonobvious features are responsible for category membership (see 
Gelman, 2003). However, there are some aspects of these methods that may make drawing 
conclusions about children’s essentialist beliefs more difficult. A key goal of the present research 
is to build upon and refine these measures to more precisely capture the belief in a causal essence 
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(Goal 1). Below, I highlight my concerns involving each of these measures and briefly describe 
how I plan to address them in the presented studies. 
 Measuring Essentialism: Metamorphosis. Common essentialism measures test 
children’s beliefs about stability over change and growth (i.e., metamorphosis) for natural kinds 
vs. artifacts (Hickling & Gelman, 1995; Inagaki & Hatano, 1996; Rosengren et al., 1991). The 
underlying assumption in these studies is that, if children are essentialist, they should understand 
that individual animals can undergo drastic metamorphosis over time and remain the same kind 
(e.g., a caterpillar turning into a butterfly), but artifacts cannot (e.g., turning a TV into a fishbowl 
changes the kind of thing that it is). Indeed, studies using this method (see Rosengren et al., 
1991) have found that young children believe that animals—but not artifacts— can undergo 
drastic physical metamorphosis (e.g., in shape, size, and color) without changing category 
membership. These findings are considered evidence for the belief in a causal essence; such 
reasoning involves an understanding that, for natural kinds, hidden features are a more accurate 
reflection for category membership than perceptual features are. In order to pass these tests, one 
must understand that—when it comes to natural kinds—what something is cannot be reduced to 
what it appears to be.  
 However, there are some methodological issues that make interpreting findings such as 
these difficult. Most notably, these tasks often rely on familiar animal categories, and specifically 
on information children may have learned in school. Children are explicitly taught from a young 
age that certain animals undergo metamorphosis (see Rosengren, 1991), and so their 
performance on these tasks may reflect this specific knowledge instead of an abstract belief in an 
underlying, causal essence. In fact, other studies have shown that children are less likely to 
attribute growth over development to more unusual species of animals that they may be less 
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familiar with (e.g., Inagaki & Sugiyama, 1988). To address this concern, I propose a more 
conservative test of children’s beliefs about stability over metamorphosis: instead of testing 
children’s beliefs about familiar animal categories, I will (1) use novel animals and (2) compare 
children’s reasoning about these items with their reasoning about novel artifacts undergoing 
similar metamorphoses (see Study 1 for additional details). This design will prevent children 
from reporting previously acquired knowledge of the physical changes certain species undergo as 
they develop.  
 Measuring Essentialism: Boundary Intensification. Another important measure of 
essentialism compares people’s beliefs about category boundaries for animals and artifacts 
(Kalish, 1995; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009a; 2009b). A common assumption in the essentialism 
literature is that people tend to have domain-specific beliefs about what causes something to be 
an animal (i.e., nature, or more specifically, its “essence”) vs. what causes something to be an 
artifact (i.e., people invent them); these different beliefs should lead people to be less flexible in 
how they categorize animal categories vs. artifact categories (Gelman & Koenig, 2003; Gelman 
& Kremer, 1991; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). If people believe that natural categories, such as 
animals, are underlain by a causal essence—but artifact categories, such as tools, are not—they 
should be more likely to think that animal categories are absolute and discrete (e.g., although an 
atypical example, a penguin is still considered fully a bird, not “sort of” a bird). In contrast, if 
people understand that artifacts are invented by people, and are therefore at least partly 
conventional, their beliefs about artifact category boundaries should be more graded and flexible 
(e.g., a beanbag chair might be “sort of” furniture).  
 Indeed, people tend to believe that members of natural kinds cannot switch category 
membership (a dog cannot become a cat, because they have different essences) or that they can 
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be members of two distinct categories (an individual cannot be both a dog and a cat). In contrast, 
people are more likely to accept subjective, and even unusual, artifact groupings	  (e.g., a “spork” 
is both a spoon and a fork; Diesendruck and Gelman, 1999; Estes, 2003; 2004; Kalish, 1995; 
2002). Moreover, people are less likely to agree that two individual animals are the same kind 
(e.g., believe that a dog and a cat should be grouped separately) than they are to agree that two 
artifacts are the same kind (e.g., they might agree to group a hammer and a screwdriver 
together).  
 In a well-known “boundary intensification” task (Rhodes et al., 2009a), children are 
asked if two different animals (e.g., a cat and a dog) or two different artifacts (e.g., a car and a 
train) could be a member of the same kind. The general conclusion drawn from these studies is 
that, because children tend to essentialize animals (and not artifacts), they believe that animal 
categories have sharper boundaries than artifact categories. However, there is an aspect of the 
design of these tasks that makes it difficult to know if children’s answers truly reflect the belief 
that animal categories have less flexible boundaries. Specifically, when referencing the artifact 
pair (a car and a train, for example), children were asked if the two individuals could be “the 
same kind of thing”; when referencing the animal pair, however, the experimenters asked if the 
individuals could be “the same kind of animal.” The wording of these questions might be 
problematic: “thing” is a more ambiguous classification than “animal,” potentially making it 
easier for children to classify artifacts as the “same kind of thing.” Moreover, “things” could be a 
superordinate category that includes “animals”; had the animal pairs been referred to as “things,” 
children may have been more likely to categorize them as the same kind. Thus, in a revised 
version of this task (see Study 1), children will be asked if both animal pairs and artifact pairs 
could be “the same kind of thing.”  
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 Measuring Essentialism: Innate Potential. Finally, essentialism measures often test the 
belief that category membership is determined at birth (see R. Gelman, 1990; Gelman & 
Wellman, 1991; Hirschfeld, 1996; Springer & Keil, 1989). In these tasks, for example, children 
are shown a baby animal (e.g., a baby cow) and told that the baby animal was raised in an 
atypical environment (e.g., a pig farm; Gelman & Wellman, 1991, Study 3). The key question 
targets children’s beliefs about what the baby animal will grow into: a pig or a cow? If children 
understand that living kinds have “innate potential” (i.e., their mature characteristics are 
determined at birth), they should understand that a baby animal will remain the same kind as it 
matures (e.g., a baby calf will grow into a cow), even if it doesn’t yet display all of the 
prototypical characteristics of its category. Such an answer would be considered essentialist.  
 However, the task above does not rule out the possibility that children were merely 
reporting category associations. The baby animal’s category is explicitly mentioned in the script 
for this task:  
“Now I’m going to tell you about a cow named Edith. Look, here’s a picture of Edith 
when she was a baby. Right after Edith was born, when she was just a tiny baby cow, she 
was taken to a farm that had pigs -- lots of pigs. See, here are the pigs on the farm. The 
pigs took care of Edith. Edith grew up on the farm with all the pigs, and she never saw 
another cow.”  
 Using category labels could convey unchanging category membership. To address this issue, a 
less familiar—but more controlled—version of the “innate potential” task was developed. 
Specifically, a revised version of this measure used plants instead of animals (e.g., Gelman & 
Wellman, 1991, Study 5). Children were shown “a seed” that came from a plant (e.g., a lemon) 
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that was planted in an atypical environment (e.g., a flower plot), and they were asked what the 
seed would grow into (e.g., a lemon or a flower). The use of seeds allowed for two key 
improvements. First, the language used never referred to the seed’s category membership (i.e., 
the experimenter said “a seed that came from a lemon,” and never “a lemon seed”). Second, a 
seed does not resemble the plant it grows into, whereas baby animals may share more physical 
characteristics with their adult counterparts. In sum, this version of the task rules out the 
possibility that children are relying on category associations or are simply mapping the 
perceptual features within kinds.3 To correctly answer the questions here, children must have 
some understanding of innate potential—that is, that immature living things will grow into the 
mature adult of their kind. I will use an adapted version of this task in the proposed studies 
below. 
 By being able to more accurately capture the belief in a causal essence (Goal 1; see 
above), I will also be able to explore a potential precursor to essentialist beliefs (Goal 2), as 
described in the next section.   
The Importance of Examining Essentialism 
 Essentialism is a pervasive assumption, with broad-ranging implications for conceptual 
development. Thus, understanding the course of its development—and more specifically its 
potential precursors—is important, and therefore a key goal of the current research (Goal 2). 
Beginning as early as age four (Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; 
Waxman, Medin, & Ross, 2007; for review, see Gelman, 2003), essentialism may influence 
concepts in useful ways. In particular, essentializing involves understanding the importance of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It’s possible that children may have some explicit knowledge about plant growth (e.g., knowing how seeds grow 
into plants) that could contribute to their performance on this task. However, children also have explicit knowledge 
about plant environments (e.g., they know that flowers grow in flowerpots). Thus, children’s concepts of innate 
potential must contribute to their performance on this task, above and beyond their explicit knowledge of plant 
development (see Study 1 method for more information). 
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category’s hidden, nonobvious properties. When we recognize that internal, perhaps invisible 
qualities (e.g., DNA) may be more indicative of category membership than outward appearances 
(e.g., a cat’s coat color), we can make useful inferences about category members even when 
appearances are deceiving. In this way, essentialism involves recognizing that different members 
of the same category (e.g., two dogs) will have similar qualities even if they have notable 
physical differences (e.g., both small and large dogs are affectionate) (Gelman & Markman, 
1986). In turn, this knowledge may help us to make decisions about individuals without having 
individual-specific information (e.g., assuming you shouldn’t feed an unfamiliar dog chocolate 
because chocolate makes dogs sick).  
 More broadly, further examining the development of essentialist beliefs will enhance our 
understanding of cognitive development. Research in this area has already altered views on 
children’s early concepts. Early developmental theories posited that young concepts are shallow 
and atheoretical, in that children focus on superficial, perceptual, concrete features (i.e., 
children’s concepts reflect a “what you see is what you get” attitude; Piaget, 1970). According to 
this view, when children reason about categories, for example, their inferences do not reflect 
theories about what it means to be a category member (e.g., what it means to be a “dog” vs. a 
“table”), but instead involve observed perceptual similarities. In a similar vein, more recent 
accounts stress the influence of perceptual features on early concepts (e.g., Fisher & Sloutsky, 
2005; Sloutsky, Kloos, & Fisher, 2007), or more specifically, that concepts undergo a shift 
across development, such that young children use concrete, surface, or characteristic features 
during categorization and it’s only with age that they recognize the importance of abstract, deep, 
or defining information (e.g., Bruner, Olver, & Greenfield, 1966; Keil & Batterman, 1984). 
These accounts suggest that having a theory or set of beliefs about what it means to be a category 
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should be a relatively late development (see Rhodes & Gelman, 2009a, for a similar argument).  
 However, the study of children’s ability to essentialize contrasts with these accounts and 
has revealed that as early as age four, children’s concepts may be more similar to those of adults 
than traditional accounts suggest. Childhood essentialism supports a “theory theory” view of 
cognitive development: across many studies, it has been found that young children do not simply 
make associations regarding perceptual similarities, but are able to search for causal explanations 
and use information beyond the obvious4 (for reviews, see Gelman, 2003; Wellman, 1990). Thus, 
understanding the developmental course of essentialist thinking may, in part, reveal the processes 
that underlie children’s early conceptual development and shed light on the level of 
sophistication in children’s concepts even before age four. 
 Finally, studying essentialism may help researchers understand how to prevent its 
negative consequences. Essentialism involves the belief that categories, including social kinds, 
are natural and based in biology. Such a belief often leads people to overlook critical variation 
within categories (e.g., believing that African Americans share many intellectual traits) and to 
exaggerate dissimilarities between different groups (e.g., believing that African Americans and 
Caucasians have many innate intellectual differences). In turn, these inferences often motivate 
stereotyping, prejudice, and endorsement of inequalities (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Dar-Nimrod 
& Heine, 2011; Haslam et al., 2002; Haslam & Whelan, 2008; Keller, 2005; Levy, Stroessner, & 
Dweck, 1998; Prentice & Miller, 2007; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008; Yzerbyt et al., 2001). 
Importantly, such judgments are generally inaccurate, as biological differences within a social 
category, such as those that reflect race or ethnicity, are just as likely as biological differences 
across different social groups (Graves, 2001; Lewontin, Rose, & Kamin, 1984; Templeton, 1999; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See the General Discussion for more on this issue. 
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for extended argument, see Leslie, 2013). Understanding the development of essentialism may 
help us to understand how these erroneous beliefs are formed in the first place, and how we may 
prevent any subsequent harmful ramifications. In the section below, I review possible sources of 
essentialist beliefs and propose a potential precursor. 
What Contributes to the Development of Essentialism? 
 My second goal here is to examine a potential precursor to essentialism.  Although it has 
been suggested that essentialist assumptions reflect the true structure of the world (e.g., Bloom, 
2000; Kornblith, 1993; Pinker, 1994), there is little support for the notion that essentialized 
categories possess true, discoverable, essences (Dupré 1981; Leslie 2013; Maglo 2011; Mayr, 
1991; Needham, 2011; Sober 1994).  However, people still believe that they do. What might lead 
to the formation of these beliefs? In this section, I will discuss what the literature to date has 
proposed as possible sources of essentialist beliefs. I will also highlight the importance of 
examining potential precursors.  
 Some accounts suppose that essentialism is a byproduct of culture or history (Fuss, 1989; 
Guillaumin, 1980). For example, as people have gained greater access to scientific knowledge 
relating to biological or nonobvious entities over time (like DNA), essentialism could reflect this 
shift in scientific understanding (Fodor, 1998). However, essentialism as a byproduct of a more 
scientifically informed society does not explain why children seem to essentialize categories 
before formally learning scientific or biological principles (Gelman & Coley, 1990). Moreover, 
essentialism is found to be present during early childhood in a variety of cultures, even in those 
with an explicitly non-essentialist belief system (e.g., the Vezo people of Madagascar do not 
consider  “Vezo” identity to be inborn or biological, yet Vezo children appear essentialist on a 
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number of traditional essentialism tasks; see Astuti, 2000), suggesting that it may begin to 
develop without instruction (Atran, 1993; Berlin, 1992). 
 In a similar vein, others have proposed that cultural messages via language may be 
largely responsible for the development of essentialist beliefs (Carey, 2000; Waxman, Medin, & 
Ross, 2007). However, children are able to form categories even in the absence of language 
(Baldwin, Markman, & Melartin, 1993; Mehler & Fox, 1985), and parents rarely mention 
essences in everyday talk with their children (e.g., Gelman, et al., 1998). Moreover, there seems 
to be a mismatch between children’s early conceptual knowledge and the conversations they 
have with their parents. That is, young children have complex beliefs about insides, causality, 
and natural kind origins (see Gelman, 2003), but parents do not discuss these topics with their 
children (Gelman, et al., 1998). It’s more likely that cultural cues help strengthen or facilitate 
already existing essentialist tendencies (e.g., beliefs about insides or causality), rather than give 
rise to essentialism on their own (see Gelman, 2003). Specifically, linguistic cues may subtly 
convey category coherence, leading children to take on essentialist attitudes in some respects. 
For example, children tend to essentialize categories referenced in generics5 (e.g., “Lions have 
manes”) more than they essentialize categories referenced in nongenerics (e.g., “This lion has a 
mane”; see Cimpian, 2013; Gelman & Tardiff, 1998; 2004; Gelman et al., 2010; Rhodes, Leslie, 
& Tworek, 2012). Generics do not convey the existence of an essence directly, but generic 
statements about a category may imply that the relationship between a category and its properties 
is stable (e.g., “Bears climb trees” suggests that bears as a category tend to climb trees, and that 
this is a stable characteristic of bears), and thus influence the extent to which a particular 
category is essentialized (Gelman & Heyman, 1999; Gelman, Ware, & Kleinberg, 2010; Rhodes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Generic statements describe a kind or category as a whole, rather than an individual member (Leslie, 2008). 
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et al., 2012; Segall, Birnbaum, Deeb, & Diesendruck, 2015). Thus, culture seems to contribute to 
the development of essentialism in more indirect ways.   
 Another possibility is that essentialism is an evolved domain-specific, biological module 
(e.g., Atran, 1998; Gil-White, 2001; Pinker, 1994). However, there is reason to believe that 
examining essentialism as a domain-specific, innate capacity may not be the best way to 
understand the development of essentialism. For one, people also essentialize categories in non-
biological domains, including socially determined kinds (Haslam, Rothschild, Ernst, 2000). 
Moreover, children begin to essentialize both animals and social groups around the same time 
and to similar degrees (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009a; Taylor, Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009). Also, the 
evidence to date suggests that essentialism may not appear until the age of four (see Gelman, 
2003), suggesting that essentialism itself is not an innate capacity. 
 Given that essentialism doesn’t seem to come from culture alone and is unlikely to be an 
evolved capacity, a fruitful endeavor may be to examine domain-general cognitive capacities or 
biases that might predate essentialism. There are a number of abilities found quite early in 
development that seem closely related to the belief in an “essence.” Beginning as early as 
infancy, young children can differentiate appearances from underlying reality (Bloom, 2001; 
Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983), understand that many properties are caused (Bullock, Gelman, 
& Baillargeon, 1982; Gelman & Kalish, 1993; Shultz, 1982), believe that self-propelled objects 
possess an “internal energy” source (Baillargeon, Wu, Yuan, Li, & Luo, 2009), and believe that 
nonobvious qualities are often causally responsible for category-typical properties (Gelman, 
Coley, & Gottfried, 1994). These and other such capacities may be present at birth and later form 
into more specific beliefs about essences (see Keil, 1995; Gelman, 2003).   
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 Recent work in social and cognitive psychology suggests that another domain-general 
process may contribute to the development of essentialism. Specifically, it has been proposed 
that the bias to explain via inherent information (i.e., the inherence heuristic) influences the 
extent to which children and adults essentialize (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014; Salomon & 
Cimpian, 2014; Sutherland & Cimpian, 2014). As young children attempt to make sense of the 
world, they are likely to explain patterns and entities in their environment in terms of their 
“inherent” characteristics. These inherent features involve an entity’s makeup (e.g., coffee is 
bitter and has caffeine), and are not essences; they are not considered the causal source of an 
entity’s category-typical properties. In the present research, I suggest that this broader 
explanatory bias is present before the onset of essentialist beliefs. Given that these two constructs 
are related in important ways (Salomon & Cimpian, 2014; Sutherland & Cimpian, 2014), 
knowing whether inherent thinking precedes essentialism will bring us closer to understanding 
how essentialist beliefs are formed in the first place.  
 Below, I outline how explanation proceeds via the inherence heuristic and the 
relationship of this heuristic to essentialism. Then I describe the predictions I will test here.  
The Inherence Heuristic as a Precursor to Essentialism 
 People are driven to understand the world, and strive to do so via explanation (e.g., Keil, 
1996; Ross, 1977). The task of generating explanations is, in principle, quite complex (Hummel, 
Licato, & Bringsjord, 2014; Landy & Hummel, 2010; Thomas, Dougherty, & Buttaccio, 2014), 
as it requires us to access and apply existing knowledge to new situations when faced with an 
unknown (Ahn et al., 1987; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987). However, our cognitive systems tend 
to simplify the process. Specifically, we often make sense of the world heuristically (Chaiken & 
Trope, 1999; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, 2011; Toplak et al., 2013). 
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Under this assumption, when we make judgments and decisions, we retrieve information from 
memory that is most accessible and salient and use that information to form our explanations. A 
recent account provides a framework for understanding the content of this information. 
Specifically, the inherence heuristic (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014) proposes that when we explain 
aspects of our environment, we are most likely to consider the inherent characteristics of what 
we’re trying to explain (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014). These inherent features involve an entity’s 
makeup (e.g., coffee has caffeine) and are distinct from relevant but non-constitutive features, 
such as an entity’s environment or place of origin (e.g., Arabica coffee beans are grown in 
Colombia). According to the inherence heuristic account, inherent features come to mind before 
external factors, making them the focal point of many explanations. Consider, for example, the 
following question: Why is coffee black? An immediate response may be to look for something 
about the properties of coffee (or, more specifically, of coffee beans) that might explain this. 
However, such immediate inherent explanations are often misleading. Coffee beans are actually 
green—it’s not until they are roasted that they begin to darken. Thus, coffee’s dark color is not 
(just) a result of the inherent properties of coffee beans, but rather in large part a downstream 
consequence of how people use them to make coffee. However, people tend to overlook such 
external factors when generating explanations and instead rely on more salient and easily 
retrievable inherent features (Hussak & Cimpian, under review).  
 Even when extrinsic information may lead us to more accurate answers, the tendency to 
explain heuristically biases the content of our explanations such that we use inherent information 
more often than extrinsic information. Notably, the tendency to explain via inherent information 
is pervasive (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014; Cimpian & Markman, 2009; 2011; McRae et al., 2005; 
Salomon & Cimpian, 2014). It emerges early in childhood, and remains a prominent feature of 
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cognition over the course of development (Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014). Moreover, the tendency 
to explain via inherent information seems to be a domain-general one: children and adults 
explain a variety of phenomena inherently, including ones involving non-essentialized entities 
such as artifacts, words, and behaviors (Gelman, 2003; Hussak & Cimpian, 2015; Keil, 1995; 
Salomon & Cimpian, 2014; Sutherland & Cimpian, 2014; Tworek & Cimpian, 2016).  
 Importantly, inherent features are not essences. An “essence” is internal, non-obvious, 
and microstructural; inherent features do not necessarily have these properties. By definition, 
essences determine category membership and cause category-typical characteristics; inherent 
features may not. An inherent feature may be characteristic, and even defining, but does not 
necessarily hold the causal responsibilities of an essence. Moreover, the inherence heuristic itself 
is not a belief at all— it is instead a process of explanation that, downstream, may inform a 
number of our beliefs. In contrast, essentialism may involve explanatory processes or biases, but 
it is defined as a specific belief about natural and social categories. In this way, explanation via 
the inherence heuristic may be a more basic process than essentialism. Thus, it seems plausible 
that the broad tendency to explain via inherent information precedes the development of the 
specific belief in a causally powerful essence.  
 More broadly, how might the inherence heuristic lead to more specific beliefs about 
essences? If children begin to make sense of the world by invoking inherent information about 
the patterns and regularities they experience, these explanations may, downstream, lead to more 
specific beliefs about essences. After habitually invoking inherent features via the explanation 
process, children may notice, and come to assume, that many patterns seem to have an inherent 
cause. This assumption, along with other early-emerging beliefs—such as the belief that many 
properties have causes (Keil, 1989; 1994), or the belief that self-propelled objects have an 
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“internal energy” (Baillargeon, Wu, Yuan, Li, & Luo, 2009)—may lead to the specific belief that 
certain kinds have a causal essence.  
Predictions of the Account: Inherent Thinking as a Precursor to Essentialism 
  Several considerations suggest that the inherence heuristic may serve as a precursor to 
the formation of essentialist beliefs.  For example, adults’ tendency to explain via inherent 
information predicts their tendency to essentialize, over and above a number of related constructs 
(Salomon & Cimpian, 2014). Moreover, manipulating the tendency to explain inherently leads to 
changes in essentialism, for both adults (Salomon & Cimpian, 2014) and children (Sutherland & 
Cimpian, in preparation). Here, I test another prediction of this account—specifically, whether 
inherent explanations are present before the onset of essentialism. As essentialism emerges by 
the age of four (Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Waxman, Medin, 
& Ross, 2007; for review see Gelman, 2003), I predict that 3-year-olds will demonstrate reliance 
on the inherence heuristic but will lack clear signs of essentialist reasoning (specifically, the 
essence assumption, as discussed above). If this prediction holds, I will have provided additional 
evidence for the claim that inherent thinking is a precursor to essentialism. The current set of 
studies tests whether three-year-old children indeed reason inherently but still lack mature 
essentialist thought. 
The Present Studies 
 The research presented here has two goals. The first is to develop and validate measures 
that test children’s beliefs about a causally powerful essence. I predict that by age 5, children will 
show developmentally normative essentialist beliefs on these measures, in line with previous 
work. The second goal of this research is to examine a possible precursor to essentialist beliefs—
namely, inherent thinking. I predict that children will show signs of this early, domain-general 
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cognitive bias before they show signs of essentialism. If essentialist reasoning indeed precedes 
inherent thinking, then there should be a time in development in which inherent thinking is 
present but essentialism is not. Providing such evidence would serve to support previous work 
suggesting that inherent thinking may be a precursor to, or lay the foundation for, essentialist 
beliefs. Essentialism seems to emerge no earlier than age four (e.g., Gelman, 2003). Thus, the 
studies presented here will compare essentialist reasoning and inherent thinking before age 
four—namely, at age three.  
In Study 1, I validate measures of essentialism designed to capture the belief in a causal 
essence (i.e., test the essence assumption). The participants in this first study were adults, as well 
as 5- and 7-year-old children. I tested these age groups in order to validate the new measures 
with age groups previously found to have essentialist beliefs (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009a; 2009b; 
Gottfried & Gelman, 2005; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; for a review, see Gelman, 2003). In 
Studies 2 and 3, I test my second prediction, that at age 3, children will show signs of inherent 
thinking but not the essence assumption.  
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CHAPTER 2: STUDY 1, DEVELOPING MEASURES 
 
 The goal of Study 1 was to develop, revise, and validate new measures of essentialism 
that most accurately capture the belief in a causal essence. Here, I refined previous measures of 
essentialism that may have involved ambiguous interpretations. As I was interested in testing the 
belief in a causal essence, I adapted, and made critical changes to, measures from previous work 
that most closely measured the essence assumption. Specifically, I measured a) the belief that 
category membership is determined at birth, b) beliefs about category stability over change and 
growth, and c) beliefs about category boundaries. An “Innate Potential” task tested the belief that 
an individual’s true nature is inborn and cannot be changed by its rearing environment. A 
“Metamorphosis” task tested the belief that living things (but not artifacts) retain their category 
membership over drastic physical change and growth.6 A “Boundaries” task tested the belief that 
children assume stricter category boundaries for animal categories than for artifacts (e.g., 
believing an individual is either in the category or outside the category because it either 
possesses the category essence or it does not; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009a; 2009b). Each of these 
tasks relies on the understanding that hidden, nonobvious features are more indicative of 
category membership than salient perceptual properties, and thus tap into the essence assumption 
over and above the kind assumption (see Gelman, 2003).  
 To validate these new measures, I tested them in three age groups: adults, as well as 5- 
and 7-year-old children. Children have been found to reason in an essentialist manner by the age 
of 5, especially when reasoning about natural kinds, such as animals (e.g., Rhodes & Gelman, 
2009a, 2009b). However, as children age, they seem to develop a better understanding that 
nonobvious qualities (e.g., an animal’s insides) are often more informative and indicative of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Beliefs about innate potential and beliefs about stability over change and growth are conceptually similar, in that 
they both involve an understanding of the importance of nature vs. nurture during development.  
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category membership than perceptual features (e.g., an animal’s color) (e.g., Gelman & 
Wellman, 1991; Gottfried & Gelman, 2005). Thus, if the measures revised here indeed tap into 
children’s understanding of an unseen yet causally powerful essence, I should find that 
essentialist beliefs as captured by these tasks are present at age five and increase by age seven. 
Additionally, I would expect to find that essentialist beliefs tend to remain present in adulthood 
on these measures.  
Finally, it is important to note that different essentialist beliefs (e.g., the belief that 
category membership is innate or the belief that category membership is stable over time) are not 
always correlated, especially in studies with children below the age of nine (e.g., Gelman et al., 
2007). Therefore, I do not expect that children will show coherence across measures of 
essentialism (although ideally measures of the same construct should in fact correlate), but this 
coherence may improve by adulthood.  
Method 
 
Participants. There were 3 groups of participants: adults, five-year-olds, and seven-year-
olds. These age groups were chosen to validate the essentialism tasks with samples previously 
found to engage in essentialist reasoning (e.g., Gelman, 2003). Fifty-eight adults (Mage = 37.98 
years, SD = 12.18; 25 men and 33 women) were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
service and paid $0.50 for participating. Three additional adults were tested but excluded from 
the final sample for failing to pay attention. Thirty-two 5-year-old children (Mage = 5.41 years, 
SD = .23; 16 girls and 16 boys) and 32 7-year-old children (Mage = 7.79 years, SD = .48; 16 girls 
and 16 boys) were recruited from a small city in the Midwestern United States. Seven additional 
children were tested but excluded from the final sample because they refused to complete the 
study. The participants were mostly European American and represented a variety of 
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socioeconomic backgrounds. 
Procedure. Both children and adults were administered the three essentialism tasks 
(Innate Potential, Boundaries, and Metamorphosis), whose order was counterbalanced across 
participants. An experimenter presented the tasks to children orally and adults completed the 
tasks online via Qualtrics. At the beginning of the survey, adults were told that they would be 
completing tasks designed for children.  
 Innate Potential Task. To test the belief in innate potential, I adapted a task from 
Gelman and Wellman (1991). This task examines the belief that an individual’s true nature, or 
“essence,” is inborn. Participants were asked to identify the type of plant that ultimately grew 
from a seed (e.g., a seed that came from a lemon) that had been planted in an atypical 
environment (e.g., a cornfield). The questions were worded so as to avoid implying category 
membership (i.e., the seed was not called a “lemon seed,” but instead a “seed that came from a 
lemon”). I did not use animal categories (as the original study in this series did) because baby 
animals and adult animals often share notable physical similarities, and so children might group 
them together based on shallow, outward appearances. Moreover, it is difficult to ask about 
animal categories without mentioning category membership (e.g., “this is a cow”). Using seeds 
instead of animals in this task takes care of these issues: seeds do not share perceptual features 
with the plants they grow into, and they may be referenced without calling attention to category 
membership. Thus, children must understand that a seed and its plant share some unobservable, 
inner quality for a seed to grow into a very different looking plant over time. If children correctly 
identify the ultimate plant, they must think that nature (vs. nurture) is more indicative of category 
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membership.7 During the task, participants were asked about three different seeds (orange, 
lemon, and rose) that were planted in three different environments (flower pot, cornfield, and 
vegetable garden, respectively). Answers to these questions were coded on a 0/1 scale (0 = 
category membership determined by environment; 1 = category membership determined by 
seed/nature) and averaged across trials, with higher scores indicating more “essentialist” 
responses.  
 Metamorphosis and Category-Boundaries Tasks. In order to present children the next 
two tasks (i.e., Metamorphosis and Boundaries), I modeled a procedure after Rhodes and 
Gelman (2009a): Children were introduced to a colorful puppet named “Feppy” and told that 
Feppy was from a far-away place “where they do lots of things differently than we do” and that 
“some of the things they do are wrong, but some of the things are just different.” Children were 
told that their job during the tasks was to tell the experimenter when “Feppy and his friends say 
something wrong and when Feppy and his friends say something that is may be right, but just 
different.” Adults read this information on their computer, and a picture of Feppy was used in 
place of the physical puppet.  
 In these tasks, participants were asked to evaluate Feppy’s opinion on a number of animal 
and artifact pairs (e.g., “Feppy and his friends think that these two things are the same kind of 
thing. Are they maybe right?”), many of which contained very different looking individuals, or 
individuals that were unlikely to be members of the same category. I used “maybe right” as an 
option in this task in order to set a low bar for a “yes” response; this element of the design allows 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 As mentioned earlier, it’s possible that children’s explicit knowledge about seeds may inform their answers in this 
task. However, children also have explicit knowledge about plant environments, making seed vs. environment a 
strong contrast. To confirm that children indeed know the plants that typically grow in certain environments, I asked 
a separate sample of 4- to 7-year-old children, about their knowledge of plant environments (e.g., “Do you know 
what grows from a flowerpot? What grows from a flowerpot?). 10 of 12 children successfully answered the 
questions about all three environments (flowerpots, cornfield, vegetable garden) used in this study.  
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participants to consider the possibility that two distinct individuals may be members of the same 
category, even when it seems unlikely. Otherwise, participants might always respond with “no,” 
making it difficult to adequately measure the relative differences between people’s beliefs about 
animal categories and their beliefs about artifact categories.  
 Metamorphosis. To test beliefs about constancy over transformations, I adapted a task 
from Rosengren et al. (1991). The questions were designed to capture children’s understanding 
that members of natural categories (e.g., a caterpillar) can undergo drastic perceptual change 
(e.g., turn into a butterfly) and remain a member of the same category. If children assume 
stability of category membership over such metamorphoses for essentialized categories, they 
should agree that a baby animal could change drastically as it matures (e.g., in shape and size) 
and retain its category membership, but that a brand-new artifact could not (e.g., a tool does not 
change in shape over time). Here, I showed children pictures of novel animals (e.g., a Dax) and 
artifacts (e.g., a Blick) so that their answers would indeed capture beliefs about metamorphosis, 
and not information that had been learned in school (such as understanding that caterpillars turn 
into butterflies). During the task, children were shown a picture of a baby animal or a new 
artifact, followed by a second, very different looking picture. Pictures were black and white, and 
all the same relative size.8 Referencing the second picture, an experimenter asked children the 
following question: “Feppy and his friends all say that this is what [Daxes/ Blicks] look like 
[when they are adults/ after they have been used for a while].9 Are they maybe right?” If children 
have the notion of a persistent, internal, causally powerful essence (which generally applies to 
animals, but not artifacts), they should be more likely to agree that the second, very different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 A norming study confirmed that adults perceived the artifact pairs (old vs. new; M = 3.72, SD = 1.64) and animal 
pairs (baby vs. adult; M = 3.91, SD = 1.61) as equally similar on a nine-point similarity scale (1 = “not at all similar” 
to 9 = “extremely similar”). 
9 Children were asked two questions to ensure they understood the meaning of “adult” (i.e., “Are you an adult?” and 
“Are your mom and dad adults?”). In the rare case that children got these questions wrong, they were corrected. 
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looking animal might be the first animal as an adult, than to agree that the second, very different 
looking tool could be the first tool later in time (see Appendix A for a full description of 
measures). Responses were coded on a 0/1 scale (yes = 1; no = 0), and averaged across animal 
and tool trials separately. Children’s Metamorphosis score was calculated as a difference score 
(Animals - Tools), such that higher scores indicated more “essentialist” responses. 
 Category Boundaries. To test children’s beliefs about category boundaries, I adapted a 
task from Rhodes and Gelman (2009a) (which was itself modified from the original task used in 
Kalish, 1998). The questions were designed to examine whether children hold stricter category 
boundaries for animals than for artifacts. Specifically, children were asked if it was “maybe right 
for Feppy and his friends to think” that two different animals (e.g., a cat and a dog) or two 
different artifacts (e.g., a car and a train) could be the same kind.  
I made a small but critical change to the questions from the original Rhodes and Gelman 
task. In the present study, when referencing both the animal pair and the artifact pair, children 
were asked if the two target individuals could be “the same kind of thing.” As mentioned 
previously, in the original task, children were asked if the individuals in the animal pair could be 
the same kind of “animal” (and “thing” was used only for artifacts). Using “animal” rather than 
the broader “thing” may have made it more difficult for children to group the two animals as the 
same kind, leading children to appear less flexible about animal categories than artifact 
categories. By asking whether both the animal pairs and the artifact pairs are “the same kind of 
thing,” I should be able to obtain a more accurate measure of how strict children are about 
category boundaries for animals vs. artifacts.10 In this revised task, if children are more likely to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 To some extent, children’s performance on this task may rely on their knowledge of superordinate category words 
(e.g., “animals”, “tools”) vs. subordinate category terms (“cat”, “car”). However, this aspect of the design makes my 
test particularly conservative. Three-year-olds know the word animal, for example, but words such as “tool” or 
“vehicle” are not yet in their vocabulary (Frank et al., 2016). Thus, children may be more likely to reference the 
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say that two artifacts could be the same kind of thing than two animals, then it’s likely that 
children have stricter category boundaries for animals than for artifacts.  
The individuals in both the animal pairs (e.g., a grey-white cat and a black dog) and the 
artifact pairs (e.g., a blue car and a yellow train) had distinct perceptual features. Thus, if 
children believe that animal categories cannot overlap (but artifacts can sometimes), they must 
recognize that something beyond perceptual properties (i.e., an essence) is responsible for animal 
category membership.  
 Participants were asked about two animal pairs (grey-white cat/black labrador; 
turtle/orange frog) and two artifact pairs (hammer/screwdriver; blue car/yellow train). Responses 
were coded on a 0/1 scale (yes = 1; no = 0), and averaged across animal and tool trials 
separately. Scores on the Boundaries task were calculated as a difference score (Tools - 
Animals), with higher scores indicating essentialist reasoning.  
 Difference scores for Metamorphosis (Animals – Tools) and Boundaries (Tools – 
Animals) were taken, and then participants’ scores on each measure were converted to a –1 to 1 
scale (–1 = anti essentialist; 0 = neutral; 1= essentialist) for ease of interpretation. An average of 
the three measures (Innate Potential, Boundaries, Metamorphosis) was computed to create a 
composite Essentialism Score (for a full description of means, see Table 1). For a full description 
of measures, please see Appendix A. 
Results 
 The goal of Study 1 was to validate my revised measures of essentialism intended to 
precisely tap into the belief in a causal essence. If the new tasks used here indeed measure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
subordinate categories (“car”, “train”) when asked about artifacts (tools and vehicles, specifically) than when asked 
about animals, making it less likely for them to say that two artifacts vs. two animals could be “the same kind of 
thing.” 
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essentialist beliefs, then participants generally considered to be essentialist—adults and children 
over the age of 5 (Gelman, 2003; Gottfried & Gelman, 2005; Gelman & Wellman, 2001; Rhodes 
& Gelman 2009a; 2009b)—should answer in an essentialist manner on my revised tasks. 
Moreover, I expect essentialist beliefs to increase between age five and age seven, and to be 
present in adulthood as well (e.g., Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Gottfried & Gelman, 2005).  
 First, I examined adults’ mean responses on the essentialism tasks. In line with previous 
work, I predicted that adults would be essentialist on these measures. One-sample t tests were 
conducted to determine if adults’ composite Essentialism scores were significantly different from 
a neutral response (0 on a –1 [anti essentialist] to 1 [essentialist] scale). The composite 
Essentialism scores for adults (M = .38, SD = .04) were significantly higher than zero, indicating 
essentialist reasoning, t(57) = 9.65, p < .001. Moreover, adults’ scores were significantly greater 
than zero on Innate Potential (M = .77, SD = .06), t(57) = 11.91, p < .001, Metamorphosis (M = 
.27, SD = .07), t(57) = 40.02, p < .001, and Boundaries (M = .11, SD = .05), t(57) = 2.09, p = 
.041 Thus, adults’ reasoning seems to be essentialist on each of these measures (rather than 
neutral or anti-essentialist), in line with previous work in the essentialism literature done with 
adults (Gelman, 1988; Gelman & O’Reilly, 1988). In other words, the adult data reported so far 
indicate that these new tasks seem to be a fair measure of the belief in a causal essence.  
Next, I analyzed the data from five- and seven-year-olds. These samples were examined 
separately, as I expected children’s essentialism to increase with age. I predicted that children 
would reason in an essentialist manner by age five, and that their essentialism should increase by 
age seven. One-sample t tests were conducted to determine if children’s Essentialism scores were 
significantly different from a neutral response (0 on a −1 [anti essentialist] to 1 [essentialist] 
scale). The composite Essentialism scores for 5-year-olds (M = .26, SD = .28) were significantly 
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higher than zero, indicating essentialist reasoning, t(31) = 5.16, p < .001. Seven-year-olds 
showed a similar pattern (M = .38, SD = .24), with a composite Essentialism score significantly 
higher than zero, t(31) = 8.75, p < .001. Overall, seven-year-olds’ Essentialism scores were 
marginally higher than five-year-olds’, t(31) = 1.88, p = .07.  
When examining children’s scores on the individual measures of essentialism, five-year-
olds’ Innate Potential scores were above chance (M = .77, SD = .55), t(31)= 7.91, p < .001, but 
their Boundaries and Metamorphosis scores were not significantly higher than the midpoint, both 
ps > .05. At seven, both children’s Innate Potential scores (M = .83, SD = .38), t(31) = 12.45, p < 
.001, and their Metamorphosis scores (M = .20, SD = .47), t(31) = 2.43, p = .02, were 
significantly higher than zero. Seven-year-olds’ Boundaries scores were not different from zero 
(M = .83, SD = .38), t(31) = 1.44, p = .161. (For means, see Table 1.)  
 Like adults, five-year-olds and seven-year-olds appear to reason in an essentialist 
manner, and children’s essentialism scores tend to increase with age. Moreover, children tend to 
be essentialist on more measures as they age. If the revised measures truly capture essentialist 
beliefs, then children and adults’ scores on these new measures should reflect findings from 
studies done with similar samples. That is indeed what I found: in line with previous work, 
children show signs of essentialist reasoning at age five. Moreover, essentialism increases by age 
seven, and it remains stable into adulthood. As the findings reported here reflect those found in 
similar samples, it seems as though the revised measures indeed capture the belief in a causal 
essence, in line with Goal 1.  
 Finally, I examined the relationship between the individual essentialism measures in each 
sample. Adults’ Innate Potential scores and their Metamorphosis scores were significantly 
correlated, r(56) = .27, p = .037, but their Boundaries scores were not correlated with either of 
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the other two measures, both ps > .59. (For correlation matrix, see Table 3.) Overall, adults had a 
low Cronbach’s alpha across these measures (α = .29). For both five-year-olds and seven-year-
olds, none of the essentialism measures were significantly correlated (see Table 3 for correlation 
matrix; αs = .37 and .27, respectively). However, this is similar to what was observed in prior 
work. As essentialism is difficult to capture and measures of it are very different from one 
another, individual measures of essentialism are not always strongly correlated (e.g., Gelman et 
al., 2007). This coherence may improve with age, however (though typically not before age 9; 
e.g., Gelman et al., 2007); in our own data, adults’ scores were significantly correlated on two of 
the three measures, whereas children’s essentialism scores were not interrelated.   
 The findings reported here provide some evidence for the validity of my revised 
essentialism tasks.  As children age, they are more likely to privilege hidden, nonobvious 
qualities over shallow, perceptual features in their reasoning about kinds, and essentialist 
reasoning of this sort remains stable into adulthood.  
 Key to achieving Goal 1, I developed a set of measures to precisely measure the belief in 
a causal essence. To date, researchers have not settled on a single way to define and measure 
essentialism, leading to a number of different methodologies. Moreover, a number of the popular 
measures of essentialism—in particular, those that most closely tap into intuitions about a causal 
essence—involve issues that make it difficult to interpret their findings. Here, I made critical 
improvements to measures that most closely capture the belief in a causal essence. The work 
accomplished in this study fills an important gap in the essentialism data reported across the 
developmental literature. These measures may help inform our understanding of children’s early 
essentialist concepts and may be used in future work examining the belief in a causal essence.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Table 1:  Essentialism Scores Across Age Groups, Study 1 
 
N = 122.  
*p < .05. ** p <.001. 
Note: Scores could range from −1 (Anti-Essentialist) to 1 (Essentialist). Asterisks indicate significant difference 
from 0 (the midpoint).  
  
 
 
  
Measure Mean Std. Dev. 95% CI p 
 
5-year-olds 
   
 
 Innate Potential 0.77 0.55   0.57, 0.97   <0.001** 
Metamorphosis  −0.06 0.40 −0.21, 0.08    0.380 
Boundaries  0.06 0.44 −0.09, 0.21    0.423 
   Average 0.26 0.28 0.16, 0.36  <0.001** 
 
7-year-olds 
   
 
 
Innate Potential 0.83 0.38 0.70, 0.97  <0.001** 
Metamorphosis  0.20 0.47 0.03, 0.37    0.021* 
Boundaries  0.09 0.37 −0.04, 0.23    0.161 
   Average 0.38 0.24 0.29, 0.46  <0.001** 
      
Adults      
Innate Potential 0.77 0.49 0.64, 0.90   <0.001** 
Metamorphosis 0.26 0.50 0.13, 0.40  <0.001** 
Boundaries 0.11 0.41 0.01, 0.22  <0.05* 
Average 0.38 0.30 0.30, 0.46  <0.001** 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics for Metamorphosis and Boundaries Tasks, Study 1 
 
 
5-year-olds 
 
7-year-olds 
 
Adults 
 
Measure Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Metamorphosis 
      
Animals 0.56 0.44 0.61 0.38 0.57 0.67 
Tools 0.63 0.40 0.41 0.35 0.43 0.41 
 
Boundaries  
      
Animals 
Tools 
0.27 
0.33 
0.35 
0.43 
0.22 
0.31 
0.33 
0.38 
0.62 
0.69 
0.60 
0.72 
       
 
Note: Responses for both Metamorphosis and Boundaries items were coded on a 0/1 scale (yes = 1; no = 0), and 
averaged across animal and tool trials separately. 
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Table 3. Correlations between individual essentialism measures, Study 1 
 
 Five-year-olds 
 
 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 
1. Innate Potential —   
2. Metamorphosis −.12 —  
3. Boundaries   .29 −.07 — 
  
Seven-year-olds 
 
 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 
1. Innate Potential —   
2. Metamorphosis   .20 —  
3. Boundaries −.12 .02 — 
  
Adults 
 
 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 
1. Innate Potential —   
2. Metamorphosis .27* —  
3. Boundaries .07 −.02 — 
    
*p < .05.   
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Figure 1.  Comparing Essentialism Scores by Measure across age groups (five-year-olds, seven-year-olds, and 
adults, respectively). Individual essentialism scores could range from −1 (Anti-Essentialist) to 1 (Essentialist). 
Innate Potential scores were calculated as an average of three items. Metamorphosis scores were calculated as a 
difference score (Animals – Tools), as were Boundaries scores (Tools – Animals). Asterisks indicate significant 
difference from zero. 
Comparing Essentialism Scores by Measure Across Age Groups, Study 1 
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Figure 2.  Composite Essentialism Scores across age groups (Five-year-olds, seven-year-olds, and adults, 
respectively). Scores could range from −1  (Anti-Essentialist) to 1(Essentialist). Composite scores were 
calculated as an average of the three essentialism tasks: Innate Potential, Metamorphosis, and Boundaries. 
Asterisks indicate significant difference from zero. 
Composite 
Score  
(−1 to 1) 
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CHAPTER 3: STUDY 2, INHERENT THINKING AS A PRECURSOR TO 
ESSENTIALISM 
 
 In Study 1, I accomplished my first goal, which was to develop and refine measures that 
capture the belief in a causal essence. These measures would also be central in achieving my 
second goal—to test a possible precursor to essentialist beliefs of the sort discussed here. In 
Study 2, I tested the prediction that three-year-olds show signs of inherent thinking, but not the 
belief in a causally powerful essence (i.e., the “essence assumption”). Here, three-year-old 
children completed the essentialism measures developed in Study 1, as well as a measure of 
inherent thinking designed for young children. I compared children’s responses on these 
measures to examine if they appear to reason inherently but do not show signs of essentialist 
thinking, as predicted. If my prediction holds true, then this study would provide additional 
evidence that the bias to explain inherently serves as a precursor to essentialism. 
Method 
 Participants. The participants were 32 3-year-old children (Mage = 3.75 years, SD = .28; 
16 girls and 16 boys) who were recruited from a small city in the Midwestern United States. The 
children were mostly European American and represented a variety of socioeconomic 
backgrounds. As a study of this nature (i.e., one relying on verbal skills) might be difficult for 
three-year-olds, I took extra precaution to ensure my final set of participants understood the 
tasks. In order to be included in the study, children needed to pass a strict inclusion criterion (see 
below for details); this screening is important in studies that rely on predominantly verbal 
material with such a young age group. An additional 21 children were excluded from the study 
based on this criterion. Eleven additional children were tested but excluded from the final sample 
because they refused to complete the study. 
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 Materials and Procedure. The materials in this study measured 1) children’s essentialist 
reasoning and 2) children’s tendency to rely on inherent thinking. The items were divided into 
two blocks (“measures”), and the order in which these blocks (as well as the individual items 
within them) were presented was counterbalanced across participants.  
 Essentialism Measure and Catch Questions. Children’s essentialist reasoning was 
assessed using the measures developed in Study 1 (Innate Potential, Metamorphosis, and 
Boundaries) (α = .26).11 In this study, however, I added catch questions to the end of the 
essentialism measure to rule out the possibility of a yes-bias and to ensure that three-year-olds 
properly understood the task. Specifically, I asked children two catch questions: one that 
required a “yes” response (“Feppy and his friends all say that baseball is a sport. Are they maybe 
right?”), and one that required a “no” response (“Feppy and his friends all say that your name is 
Sammy. Are they maybe right?”). In order to be included in the study, children needed to get 
both questions correct.  
Inherent Thinking. To measure children’s reliance on the inherence heuristic, I adapted a 
measure used in prior work on this topic with young children (Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014; 
Sutherland & Cimpian, 2015). This measure was a composite that consisted of three items 
(“Explanation”, “Stability”, and “Changeability”) aimed to capture children’s explanatory 
intuitions more broadly (see Sutherland & Cimpian, 2015). Children tend to reason inherently 
about a broad range of phenomena, such as many social-conventional patterns. Importantly, 
many of these patterns do not fall under the scope of categories typically essentialized by young 
children. As I wanted to test the prediction that children reason inherently before the onset of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Due to this low alpha, all analyses will be reported for individual Essentialism scores. However, as it is not 
uncommon for essentialism studies to collapse across measures with a low alpha, I will also be reporting composite 
scores.  
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essentialism, it was important to measure children’s inherent thinking in a non-essentialized 
domain. Thus, in this set of measures, I asked children about two social-conventional patterns 
(i.e., birthday cakes having candles and coins being round).  
 Explanation. The first item in this measure asked children to indicate their agreement 
with inherent and extrinsic explanations for everyday, social-conventional patterns (e.g., birthday 
cakes having candles).  As it would be too difficult for three-year-olds to generate their own 
explanations in this task, I asked them to evaluate explanations instead. Moreover, I presented 
them with relatively broad explanations that might cover the range of inherent explanations 
children could, in principle, come up with on their own (e.g., birthday cakes have candles “just 
because they are birthday cakes”). The extrinsic explanations were similarly broad (e.g., birthday 
cakes have candles “just because people thought it might be a nice idea”). If children rely on the 
inherence heuristic, they should agree with inherent explanations more than extrinsic 
explanations. Each child evaluated an inherent and an extrinsic explanation for each of the two 
patterns. After each explanation was presented, the experimenter asked the child whether they 
thought it was “right” or “not right”; as a follow-up, the experimenter asked the child to further 
rate their agreement (i.e., “Is it a little [right/ not right] or really [right/ not right]?”).  Thus, 
children’s responses to these “Explanation” questions were ultimately scored on a four-point 
scale (1 = “really not right” to 4 = “really right”).  Children’s answers to each explanation type 
were averaged across trials, and then children’s evaluations for the inherent and extrinsic 
explanations12 were averaged to create a composite Explanation score.  
Stability and Changeability. The other items in the measure of inherent reasoning tapped 
intuitions that follow closely from inherent explanations. Inherent explanations often make the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Children’s answers to the extrinsic explanations were reverse-scored.  
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pattern under examination appear necessary or obligatory (see Tworek & Cimpian, 2016, for 
extended argument). Thus, the next sets of questions in this measure were designed to capture 
children’s beliefs about the necessity of conventional patterns. In one set of questions, children 
were asked to indicate whether they thought everyday patterns remained stable over time (e.g., 
“Do you think birthday cakes will always have candles, even way into the future when the last 
birthday cake is made?”). Children’s responses to these “Stability” questions were rated on a 
“yes/no” scale (0 = no, 1 = yes). If children reason inherently by age three, then they should 
agree that conventional patterns are necessary, and thus remain stable over time.  
In another set of questions, children were asked if these patterns were changeable (e.g., 
“Imagine if people wanted birthday cakes to not have candles, and everyone agreed that they 
wanted birthday cakes to not have candles. Would it be okay to make a change so that birthday 
cakes do not have candles?”). Answer options were “yes” or “no” to this question. If they 
responded “no,” children were asked a follow-up question: namely, if it was “sort of not okay,” 
“not okay,” or “really not okay” to make this change. Children’s responses to each of these two 
questions were scored as follows: −1 = “okay”; .33 = “sort of not okay”; .66 = “not okay”; 1 = 
“really not okay”. Children’s answers were then aggregated across items to create a composite 
Changeability score, with higher scores indicating more inherent thinking. This scale was coded 
such that the midpoint (“0”, in this case) would reflect neither anti-inherent nor inherent 
reasoning. Thus, scores below “0” reflected “anti-inherent” reasoning and scores above “0” 
reflected “inherent” reasoning. If children rely on the inherence heuristic, and believe many 
patterns to be obligatory, they should think it’s “not okay” to change a social convention (for a 
similar argument, see Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014).  
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 Pattern order (i.e., birthday cakes and coins) as well as item order (i.e., Explanation, 
Changeability, and Stability) was fully counterbalanced across participants. For ease of 
comparison with the essentialism measures, children’s scores for the Explanation and Stability 
measures were also converted to a scale from −1 (anti inherent) to 1 (inherent), with 0 as the 
neutral midpoint. A composite “Inherent Thinking” score was calculated as an average of the 
three measures (Explanation, Stability, Changeability; α = .15).13 For a full description of 
measures, please see Appendix A.  
Results 
 
 The goal of Study 2 was to test a possible precursor to the belief in a causal essence. 
Previous accounts have proposed that an early-emerging bias to explain inherently precedes 
essentialist beliefs (Salomon & Cimpian, 2014; Sutherland & Cimpian, 2014). Here, I test a 
specific prediction of this account: that three-year-old children would show signs of inherent 
thinking, but not yet show signs of the belief in an essence. For this prediction to be supported, 
children’s essentialism scores should be below or no different from the midpoint of the scale (0 
on a −1 [anti-essentialist] to 1 [essentialist] scale), but their inherence heuristic scores should be 
significantly higher than the midpoint (0 on a −1 [anti-inherence] to 1 [inherence] scale). At the 
level of individual children, if inherent thinking is indeed a precursor of essentialist beliefs, it 
should be more likely for essentialism to occur in the presence of inherent thinking than in the 
absence of inherent thinking. Similarly, I would also predict that it should be more likely for 
inherent thinking to be present in absence of essentialism than for essentialism to be present in 
absence of inherent thinking. In other words, I should find that more children are “inherent 
thinkers” but not “essentialists” than children who are “essentialists” but not “inherent thinkers.”  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 As with the Essentialism scores, I will report analyses on individual measures of Inherent Thinking due to the low 
alpha. However, I will also report a composite score in order for ease of comparison to the essentialism data.  
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 Means and Correlations. To test whether three-year-olds have yet developed the belief in 
a causal essence, I examined their mean levels of essentialism. First, I conducted a one-sample t 
test to determine if children’s composite Essentialism scores were significantly different from a 
neutral response (0 = neither essentialist nor anti-essentialist). As predicted, three-year-olds’ 
composite Essentialism scores (M = .01, SD = .29) were not significantly different from zero, 
t(31) = 0.17, p = .865. These results suggest that three-year-olds did not engage in essentialist 
reasoning. Moreover, three-year-olds’ scores were not significantly different from zero on any of 
the three essentialism measures (Innate Potential, Metamorphosis, and Boundaries; all ps >= .05) 
(see Table 4 for full description of statistics). As predicted, three-year-old children do not seem 
to have the notion of a causal essence as tested here. Moreover, none of the essentialism 
measures were significantly correlated, all ps > .05 (see Table 8 for full correlation matrix), 
which might be expected given that three-year-olds do not seem to have these beliefs yet, and 
because essentialism measures often do not begin to cohere until later in development (see 
Gelman et al., 2007).  
 Next, I examined three-year-olds’ mean levels of inherent thinking. If inherent thinking 
precedes essentialism, then three-year-olds should show signs of inherent thinking. A one-
sample t test was conducted to determine if a statistically significant difference existed between 
children’s Inherent Thinking scores (M = .22, SD = .35) and a neutral response (0 = neither 
inherent nor anti-inherent). As predicted, three-year-olds’ Inherent Thinking scores were 
significantly above the neutral mid-point, t(31) = 3.54, p < .001. Additionally, I conducted a 
paired-sample t test to examine whether children’s composite Essentialism scores and Inherent 
Thinking scores were significantly different from each other. Three-year-olds’ Essentialism 
scores were indeed significantly lower than their Inherent Thinking scores, t(31) = 2.46, p = .02. 
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The data reported so far indicate that three-year-old children show early signs of inherent 
intuitions, but do not seem to possess the belief in a causal essence.  
 Finally, I examined three-year-olds’ scores on each inherent thinking measure separately. 
Only their Stability scores (M = .66, SD = .59) were significantly different from zero, t(31) = 
6.31, p < .001. Children’s Changeability scores (M = −.03, SD = .79) and their Explanation 
scores (M = .03, SD = .39) did not differ from zero, both ps > .05 (see Table 4). Thus, three-year-
olds show signs of inherent thinking, but this evidence is only apparent on measures of Stability. 
Notably, children’s scores on these measures were not correlated with one another, all ps > .05 
(for full correlation matrix, see Table 8); this result might be explained by the fact that young 
children’s explanatory biases were not strong on measures of changeability or explanation. If 
children do not have strong beliefs about the necessity of patterns (i.e., changeability beliefs) or 
about the reasons those patterns exist (i.e., explanation evaluations), it may be difficult to pick up 
any meaningful variability in such biases.  
 Individual Response Patterns. The results reported thus far suggest that three-year-old 
children show early signs of inherent thinking but have not yet developed the belief in a causal 
essence. Another way to test the claim that inherent thinking develops before the belief in a 
causal essence would be to test whether essentialism is more likely to be present when inherent 
thinking is also present than when inherent thinking is not present. Additionally, at the individual 
level, three-year-old children should be more likely to be “inherent thinkers” but not 
“essentialists” than they are to be “essentialists” but not “inherent thinkers.” In order to examine 
this possibility, I first classified children as inherent thinkers (vs. non-inherent thinkers) and 
essentialists (vs. non-essentialists). Children were considered inherent thinkers if their answers 
leaned towards inherence on 2 of the 3 Inherent Thinking questions (i.e., Stability, 
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Changeability, and Explanation). Similarly, children were considered essentialists if their 
answers leaned towards essentialist reasoning on 2 of the 3 Essentialism questions (i.e., Innate 
Potential, Metamorphosis, and Boundaries). For details regarding this classification system, see 
Table 5. 
 I first tested whether there were more essentialist children among inherent thinkers than 
among non-inherent thinkers. Although the relative frequencies trended in the predicted direction 
(23.1% essentialists among inherent thinkers vs. only 10.5% among non-inherent thinkers), a 
Fisher’s exact test indicated that the difference was not significant, p = .374. A related prediction 
of the proposal that the inherence heuristic is a precursor of essentialism is that there should be 
significantly fewer children who are essentialists but not inherent thinkers than children who are 
inherent thinkers but not essentialists. To test this prediction, I looked specifically at children 
who were classified in one category but not the other (n = 12), leaving out any children who 
were in neither or both. A binomial test revealed that, in this subset of children, there were 
indeed significantly fewer children who were essentialists only (2 of 12 children) than children 
who were inherent thinkers only (10 out of 12), p = .04. These results are in line with the claim 
that inherent thinking may develop earlier than the belief in a causal essence.  
 Discussion. Overall, these data seem to suggest that even when there are no signs of 
essentialist reasoning, there are early signs of inherent thinking, particularly the belief in the 
stability of patterns over time. Note that the patterns in question (i.e., coins, birthday cakes) are 
not patterns that children typically essentialize. Thus, children as young as three seem to be 
engaging in a cognitive process conceptually distinct from essentialism, but that may 
nevertheless serve as a precursor to essentialism. Although children did not score high on all 
measures of inherent thinking, their intuitions about the stability of societal patterns were quite 
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strong. It’s possible that children’s early inherent intuitions are best captured by their beliefs 
about the stability of patterns over time, or questions about stability are easier for young children 
to grasp than those reflecting other inherent intuitions. In fact, these findings are consistent with 
developmental studies on the inherence heuristic. Young children’s Stability scores tend to be 
much higher than their Changeability and Explanation scores (see Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014). 
However, one could argue that children’s answers to the stability questions simply portray a yes-
bias, as “yes” reflected an inherent response on all these questions. Although I included catch 
items to rule out this possibility, those catch items were part of my Essentialism measure, not the 
Inherent Thinking measure. I address these and other possible issues in Study 3.   
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Figures and Tables 
 
 
Table 4: Three-year-olds Essentialism and Inherent Thinking Scores, Study 2 
 
Measure Mean Std. Dev.  95% CI p 
Essentialism 
  
 
  Innate Potential 0.10 0.75  −0.17, 0.37 0.438 
Metamorphosis  0.02 0.43  −0.14, 0.17 0.839 
Boundaries  −0.09 0.37  −0.23, 0.04 0.161 
   Average 0.01 0.29  −0.09, 0.11 0.865 
Inherent Thinking 
  
 
  Stability 0.66 0.59    0.44, 0.87 0.001** 
Changeability −0.03 0.79  −0.32, 0.25 0.825 
Explanation  0.03 0.39  −0.11, 0.17 0.709 
   Average  0.22 0.35    0.09, 0.34 0.001** 
 
N = 32.  
*p < 0.01. ** p <0.001. 
Note: Scores could range from −1  (Anti-Essentialist) to 1(Essentialist) or −1  (Anti-Inherent) to 1(Inherent). 
Asterisks indicate significant difference from 0 (the midpoint).  
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Table 5. Classification system to categorize children as  “inherent thinkers” or “essentialists” 
 
Inherent Thinking Questions (using birthday cakes have candles fact) 
Classified as 
“Inherent” if… 
 
Stability (2 items, 4 questions total): 
 
a. Do you think birthday cakes have always had candles, even way back when the 
first ever birthday cake was made? Have birthday cakes always had candles?  
 
b. Do you think birthday cakes will always have candles, even way into the future, 
when the very last birthday cake is made? Will birthday cakes always have candles?  
 
Scoring: 0 = “no”, 1 = “yes” 
 
 
 
 
 
Gave predicted answer 
(“yes”) on a majority of 
the questions (3 out of 
4.) 
 
Changeability (2 items, 2 questions total): 
 
Imagine if people wanted birthday cakes to not have candles, and everyone agreed 
that they wanted birthday cakes to not have candles. Would it be okay to make this 
change? Would it be okay to make a change so that birthday cakes do not have 
candles? 
 
Children could respond with “yes” or “no.” If they responded with “no,” 
the experimenter asked a follow-up: 
 
Would it be sort of not okay, not okay, or really not okay to make a change so that 
birthday cakes don’t have candles?  
 
Scoring: 4-point scale (1 = “okay” to 4 = “really not okay”) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gave predicted answer 
(“no”) on both questions. 
 
 
Explanation (2 items, 2 inherent and 2 extrinsic responses total): 
 
Ok, so one person said that birthday cakes have candles…. 
 
[EXTRINSIC]: … just because people thought it might be a nice idea. But birthday 
cakes don’t really have to have candles. 
  
Is this person right or not right to think that birthday cakes have candles just because 
people thought it might be a nice idea? * 
 
[INHERENT]: …just because they are birthday cakes. And birthday cakes have to 
have candles.  
 
Is this person right or not right to think that birthday cakes have candles just because 
they're birthday cakes?  
 
Children could respond with “right” or “not right.” The experimenter followed-up 
with a scale for each response.  
 
Scoring: 4-point scale (1 = “really not right” to 4 = “really right”) 
  * Indicates reversed scoring 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agreement with inherent 
explanation was greater 
than agreement with 
extrinsic explanation 
(before reversed-scored) 
for both items. 
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Note. Children were classified as “Inherent Thinkers” if their answers were “Inherent” on 2/3 of the Inherent Thinking questions. 
Children were classified as “Essentialists” if their answers were “Essentialist” on 2/3 of the Essentialism questions.  
 
Table 5 (cont.) 
 
 
 
Essentialism Questions 
Classified as 
“Essentialist” if… 
Innate Potential (3 items, 3 questions total) 
This seed came from an [orange/lemon/rose]. A girl named Jennifer took this seed 
out of the orange. Then she planted the seed in a [flower pot/ cornfield/vegetable 
garden]. See, here’s the [flower pot/cornfield/vegetable garden]. Now I’m going to 
ask you some questions.  
 
So where did the seed come from? And where did [Jennifer/Ashley/Lauren] plant 
this seed?  
 
When that seed grew, what popped up out of the ground, was it an orange tree or a 
flower? 
 
Scoring: 0 = “environment”, 1 = “seed” 
 
 
 
 
 
Gave predicted answer 
(going with the seed) on a 
majority of the questions 
(2 out of 3). 
Metamorphosis 
 
Animals (2 items, 2 questions total): 
 
Here is a baby [Dax/Frip]. [Daxes/Frips] are animals. And this is a baby [Dax/Frip]. 
Here is another picture.  Let’s see what Feppy says about this new picture.  
 
 Feppy and his friends ALL say that this is what [Daxes/Frips] look like when they 
are adults.  
 
Are they maybe right? [Yes/ No] 
 
Tools: (2 items, 2 questions total): 
 
Here is a brand new [Blick /Joop]. [Blicks/Joops] are tools. And this is a brand new 
[Blick/Joops] (point again). Here is another picture. Let’s see what Feppy says 
about this new picture. 
 
Feppy and his friends ALL say that this is what [Blicks/Joops] look like after they 
have been used for a while.  
 
Are they maybe right? [Yes/ No] 
 
Scoring: 0 = “no”, 1 = “yes” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gave the predicted answer 
(“yes” for animals, “no” 
for artifacts) on a majority 
of the questions (3 out of 
4). 
Boundaries (4 items, 2 tool and 2 animal questions) 
 
Here are a couple of things. Let’s see what Feppy says about them. Feppy and his 
friends ALL say that these are the same kind of thing.  
 
Are they maybe right? [Yes/ No] 
 
Scoring: 0 = “no”, 1 = “yes” 
 
 
Gave the predicted answer 
(“no” for animals, “yes” 
for artifacts) on a majority 
of the questions (3 out of 
4). 
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Table 6. Frequency of inherent thinkers and essentialists in Study 2 
 
 
 
Inherent Thinkers 
 
 
Essentialists 
  
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
3 
 
2 
 
No 
 
10 
 
17 
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Figure 3.  Composite Essentialism Scores across age groups (Three-year-olds, Five-year-olds, seven-year-olds, 
and adults, respectively). Scores could range from −1  (Anti-Essentialist) to 1(Essentialist). Composite scores 
were calculated as an average of the three essentialism tasks: Innate Potential, Metamorphosis, and Boundaries. 
Asterisks indicate significant difference from zero. 
Composite 
Score  
( −1  to 1) 
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CHAPTER 4: STUDY 3, REPLICATING STUDY 2 
 
 In the preceding study, I found that three-year-old children show early signs of inherent 
thinking (as captured by measures of stability), but that these children do not show signs of 
essentialist reasoning. The goals of Study 3 were to 1) replicate the findings of Study 2 with 
different inherent thinking items for increased generalizability, and 2) to rule out the possibility 
that children’s answers to the Stability questions simply reflected a yes-bias. Moreover, this new 
study included an enhanced warm-up procedure, as well as additional catch questions for each 
measure (i.e., Essentialism and Inherent Thinking), to further ensure that the three-year-olds 
could process the verbal material in our measures.  
Participants. The participants were 32 three-year-old children (Mage = 3.79 years, SD = 
.27; 16 girls and 16 boys) who were recruited from a small city in the Midwestern United States. 
From the final dataset of 32 children total, 9 children were excluded from the Essentialism 
measure for failure to meet the criterion on relevant catch questions. Eight additional children 
were excluded from the Inherent Thinking measure for failing its relevant catch questions. 
Another 8 children were excluded from the sample altogether for failing the catch questions in 
both measures (see below for details). The children were mostly European American and 
represented a variety of socioeconomic backgrounds. 
Materials and Procedure. The materials used were the same as in Study 1, except that I 
used new items for the inherence heuristic (instead of birthday cakes and candles, I asked 
children about the following patterns: “TV are rectangles” and “Pajamas are for nighttime”) and 
included a new warm-up and additional catch questions. For a complete description of these 
materials, see Appendix A. 
Warm-up. Before the Boundaries and Metamorphosis tasks, children were given a warm-
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up to make sure they understood the “Are they maybe right?” procedure. As in Study 1, children 
were introduced to a visitor named “Feppy.” I then asked them the catch questions from Study 1. 
That is, children were asked a “no” question (“Feppy and his friends ALL say that your name is 
Sammy. Are they maybe right?”) and a “yes” question (“Feppy and his friends ALL say that 
baseball is a sport. Are they maybe right?”). If children got a warm-up question wrong, they 
were corrected before moving on. 
 Catch questions. Recall that, in Study 2, I had only one set of catch questions (which was 
placed after the Essentialism measure), and children were excluded from the entire study if they 
got one catch question wrong. In this new study, I included a set of catch questions after both the 
Essentialism and the Inherent Thinking measures. Thus, children’s responses to the inherent 
thinking items could be excluded while their responses to the essentialism items preserved, and 
vice-versa. Specifically, children were asked four catch questions for the Inherent Thinking 
measure (asked after the Inherent Thinking questions were completed), and five catch questions 
for the Essentialism measure. One of the Essentialism catch questions was asked after the Innate 
Potential items, and the other four were asked after both the Metamorphosis and Boundaries 
items. (This was because the Metamorphosis and Boundaries questions had a similar format, 
compared to the format for the Innate Potential items.) Because my main analyses examined the 
mean levels on individual measures, children could be excluded on the basis of the catch 
questions from just the Inherent Thinking measure, just the Essentialism measure,14 or both.  
 Inherent Thinking Catch Questions. As children’s inherent thinking was highest on 
Stability, my catch questions for the Inherent Thinking measure aimed to rule out the possibility 
of a Stability yes-bias. Children were asked two “yes” questions (“Do you think the sun has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Children could have been excluded from just the Innate Potential task or just the Metamorphosis/Boundaries task, 
or both. 
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always been hot, even way back when the sun shone for the first time? Has the sun always been 
hot?” and “Do you think the sky has always been up, even way back when people first saw the 
sky? Has the sky always been up?”) and two “no” questions (“Do you think you will always be 
three, even way into the future, when you’re all grown up? Will you always be three?” and “Do 
you think you will always be sitting in that chair, even way into the future, when you’re at home 
and not here anymore? Will you always be sitting in that chair?”). These catch questions were 
modeled after the Stability test questions. Children were excluded from the Inherent Thinking 
measure if they got more than one question wrong (n = 8).  
 Essentialism Catch Questions: Innate Potential. After the Innate Potential questions, 
children were told that “a seed that came from a pumpkin” was planted in a “pumpkin patch.” As 
a catch question, they were then asked (“When the seed from the pumpkin grew, what popped up 
out of the pumpkin patch, was it a pumpkin plant or a tomato plant?”). No additional children 
were excluded from only the Innate Potential block. That is, children who got this catch question 
wrong (n = 9) also failed the catch criterion during the Metamorphosis/Boundaries items (see 
below), and were excluded from the entire Essentialism measure. 
 Essentialism Catch Questions: Metamorphosis/Boundaries. Finally, children were asked 
four catch questions after the Metamorphosis and Boundaries questions. As in the Inherent 
Thinking measure, children were asked two “yes” questions (“Feppy and his friends ALL say 
that kids go to school. Are they maybe right?” and “Feppy and his friends ALL say that some 
people like ice-cream. Are they maybe right?”) and two “no” questions (“Feppy and his friends 
ALL say that trees can talk. Are they maybe right?” and “Feppy and his friends ALL say that 
dogs have wings. Are they maybe right?”). Children were excluded from the Metamorphosis and 
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Boundaries items if they got more than one of these catch questions wrong (n = 9). (These are 
the same 9 children who also got the Innate Potential catch questions wrong.) 
Results 
 In the previous study, I found that three-year-old children show early signs of inherent 
intuitions, but do not display any signs of an essence assumption. In this study, I sought to 
replicate these findings with an inherent thinking measure that asked about different patterns 
(e.g., TVs being rectangles and PJs being worn at night). Moreover, extra catch questions were 
added to the Inherent Thinking measure and to the Essentialism measure to ensure the children 
included in the study understood the task. 
  Means and Correlations. As in Study 2, I first examined three-year-olds’ mean levels of 
essentialism, to determine if they show signs of a belief in a causally powerful essence. 
Specifically, I conducted a one-sample t test to determine if children’s composite Essentialism 
scores (M = .03, SD = .29) were significantly different from a neutral response (0 = neither 
essentialist nor anti-essentialist). Again, three-year-olds’ Essentialism scores were no different 
from zero, t(22) = .53, p = .603. Three-year-olds’ scores in this study, like those in Study 2, were 
not significantly different from zero on any of the three essentialism measures (Innate Potential, 
Metamorphosis, and Boundaries; all ps > .05). As predicted, these results replicate my findings 
from Study 2—that three-year-olds show no signs of having formed the belief in a causal essence 
(i.e., the “essence assumption”). Also, as in Study 2, none of the essentialism measures were 
significantly correlated, all ps > .05 (see Table 8 for full correlation matrix); again, this is not 
surprising given that three-year-olds do not show any signs of essentialism, and that previous 
work has found that young children’s essentialism is not typically coherent (Gelman et al., 
2007).   
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 Next, I examined three-year-olds’ inherent thinking. I conducted a one-sample t test to 
determine if a statistically significant difference existed between children’s composite Inherence 
Thinking scores and a neutral response (0 = neither inherent nor anti-inherent). As in Study 2, 
three-year-olds’ Inherent Thinking scores (M = .31, SD = .28) were significantly above the mid-
point, t(24) = 5.39, p < .001. I also conducted a paired-sample t test to examine whether 
children’s Essentialism scores (M = .07, SD = .27) and Inherent Thinking scores (M = .38, SD = 
.30) were significantly different from each other. Three-year-olds’ Inherent Thinking scores were 
significantly higher than their Essentialism scores, t(15) = 2.60, p = .02. 
 When examining three-year-olds’ scores on each Inherent Thinking measure separately, 
only their Stability scores (M = .64, SD = .55) were significantly different from zero, t(24) = 
5.82, p < .001. As in the preceding study, children’s Changeability scores (M = .23, SD = .68) 
and their Explanation scores (M = .05, SD = .28) did not differ from zero, both ps > .05. 
Children’s scores on these measures were not correlated with one another, all ps > .05 (for full 
correlation matrix, see Table 8). Again, this may be explained by the fact that children did not 
seem to have strong intuitions about changeability or explanations, at least given my particular 
measures; thus, these variables may not be picking up meaningful variability in children’s 
explanatory biases.  
 Individual Response Patterns. As in Study 2, these initial results seem to suggest that 
children may reason inherently before they develop the belief in a causal essence.  
Using the classification system developed in Study 2, I again examined whether essentialists 
were more common among inherent thinkers than non-inherent thinkers. The relative frequency 
of essentialists among inherent thinkers was not significantly different than the frequency of 
essentialists among non-inherent thinkers, p = .125 (see Table 10 for frequencies). I also looked 
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specifically at children who were classified in one category but not the other (i.e., were 
essentialists or inherent thinkers). As in Study 2, a binomial test indicated that in this subset of 
children, there were significantly fewer children who were essentialists only (2 of 12 children) 
than children who were inherent thinkers only (10 out of 12), p = .04. Thus, the results reported 
here suggest that young children may engage in inherent reasoning before they develop the belief 
in a causal essence.  
 Discussion. Overall, the three-year-olds in this study behaved similarly to those in Study 
2. Even when asked about a different set of social-conventional patterns, children showed signs 
of inherent intuitions before they seemed to show signs of essentialist beliefs. Recall that I had 
strict inclusion criteria in this study—only children who demonstrated that they understood the 
format of the tasks were included. Still, I found no traces of essentialist beliefs, but evidence 
suggesting that young children have early inherent intuitions. Moreover, there were more 
children capable of thinking inherently but not essentializing than there were children capable of 
essentializing but not inherent thinking.  
 It is important to consider what three-year-olds’ inherent intuitions (as revealed in this 
study, as well as Study 2) mean for young children’s concepts. Children seem to have strong 
beliefs about the stability of social-conventional patterns over time. Interestingly, in this study, as 
well as in Study 2, these beliefs were about patterns that fall outside the scope of essentialized 
domains. Specifically, the domains considered here (in regard to inherent thinking) are not 
domains in which children tend to believe that category membership is caused by a physical, 
nonobvious essence. (For example, young children do not typically believe that a physical, 
internal essence is causally responsible for the shape of TVs.) Thus, even though three-year-olds 
did not have strong intuitions regarding the malleability of conventions (i.e., Changeability), or 
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intuitions about the reason those patterns exist (i.e., their Explanation evaluations), they did 
display early intuitions distinct from (yet perhaps related to) essentialism. Taken together with 
previous work (e.g., Salomon & Cimpian, 2014; Sutherland & Cimpian, 2014), these findings 
suggest that early inherent intuitions may contribute to the development of essentialist beliefs. 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 7: Three-year-olds Essentialism and Inherent Thinking Scores, Study 3 
 
N = 32.  
* p < .001. 
Note: Scores could range from −1  (Anti-Essentialist) to 1(Essentialist) or −1  (Anti-Inherent) to 1(Inherent). 
Asterisks indicate significant difference from 0 (the midpoint).  
 
  
Measure Mean Std. Dev. 95% CI p 
Essentialism     
Innate Potential 0.16 0.78   −0.18, 0.50   0.340 
Metamorphosis −0.07 0.35 −0.22, 0.08   0.377 
Boundaries 0.00 0.21 −0.09, 0.09   1.000 
Average 0.03 0.29 −0.09, 0.15   0.603 
Inherent Thinking     
Stability 0.64 0.55 0.41, 0.87 <0.001* 
Changeability 0.22 0.67 −0.05, 0.51                     0.106 
Explanation 0.05 0.28 −0.06, 0.17                     0.356 
Average 0.31 0.28 0.19, 0.42 <0.001* 
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Table 8. Correlation Matrices, Studies 2 and 3 
 
Study 2: Three-year-olds 
 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Innate Potential 
—      
2. Metamorphosis 
−0.22 —     
3. Boundaries 
−0.04 0.06 —    
4. Stability 
−0.06 −0.27 0.22 —   
5. Changeability 
−0.31 0.08 0.24 −0.08 — 	 
6. Explanation 
−0.04 −0.07 0.26 −0.02 0.07 —	 
 
Study 3: Three-year-olds 
 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4.  5.  6.  
1. Innate Potential 
—      
2. Metamorphosis 
−0.04 —     
3. Boundaries 
0.00 −0.15 —    
4. Stability 
−0.44 −0.19 0.15 —   
5. Changeability 
0.07 −0.22 −0.19 −0.01 —  
6. Explanation 
 
0.03 0.03 0.11 −0.16 −0.13 — 	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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Metamorphosis and Boundaries Tasks, Studies 2 & 3 
 
 
3-year-olds: Study 2 
 
3-year-olds: Study 3 
 
Measure Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Metamorphosis 
    
Animals 0.56 0.45 0.50 0.50 
Tools 0.55 0.43 0.57 0.46 
 
Boundaries 
    
Animals 
Tools 
0.56 
0.47 
0.44 
0.46 
0.46 
0.46 
0.48 
0.45 
     
 
Note: Responses for both Metamorphosis and Boundaries items were coded on a 0/1 scale (yes = 1; no = 0), and 
averaged across animal and tool trials separately. 
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Table 10. The frequency of inherent thinkers and essentialists in Study 3 
 
 
 
Inherent Thinkers 
 
 
Essentialists 
  
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
0 
 
2 
 
No 
 
10 
 
4 
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The research described here had two goals. First, I set out to develop a new set of 
essentialism measures that could adequately capture the essence assumption—that an underlying, 
physical structure or quality (i.e., an essence) causes category membership and gives rise to 
category-typical properties. Research on essentialism to date has not carefully mapped out which 
measures tap which aspects of people’s essentialist reasoning, so it was important to begin to 
clarify this issue. Second, I sought to fill an important gap in the essentialism literature by 
examining a possible precursor to essentialist beliefs—namely, an early-emerging explanatory 
bias that leads children and adults to explain via inherent information (i.e., the inherence 
heuristic; Cimpian & Salomon, 2014). Although it has been discussed, little work has exposed 
the foundation of essentialist beliefs. To add to a growing body of work supporting inherent 
thinking as a precursors to essentialism (Salomon & Cimpian, 2014; Sutherland & Cimpian, 
2014), I investigated the unique prediction that inherent thinking develops before the onset of 
essentialist beliefs. As essentialism is thought to begin no earlier than age 4, I tested the presence 
of essentialism and inherent thinking in 3-year-old children.  
 In line with Goal 1, I successfully developed and validated measures that more accurately 
assess the belief in a causal essence. My design involved measures intended to capture: 1) the 
belief that category identity is determined at birth, 2) the belief that animals (vs. artifacts) retain 
identity over metamorphosis, and 3) the belief that category boundaries are strict for animals 
(compared to that of artifacts). If properly designed, these measures should test the 
understanding that nonobvious features have causal importance for categories, and thus tap into 
intuitions beyond the kind assumption (i.e., the belief that natural categories have many 
commonalities). Indeed, in my validation study, children and adults gave developmentally 
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appropriate responses. A number of developmental studies have shown that children understand 
the causal importance of nonobvious features (such as essences) for categories by age five, and 
this understanding becomes more sophisticated as children age (e.g., Gottfried et al., 2005). In 
the data reported here, five-year-old children show early signs of essentialist reasoning, and this 
reasoning is more apparent when children reach the age of seven; moreover, essentialist 
intuitions of this sort seem to remain present in adulthood. Thus, these improved measures of 
essentialism seem to adequately test the essence assumption as intended. Researchers interested 
in capturing children’s assumptions about essences (beginning at age three) should consider 
using these revised measures in future work, or rely on them as a guideline when developing 
studies of a similar nature.  
In line with Goal 2, I provide evidence that an early explanatory bias (i.e., the tendency to 
reason inherently) might predate essentialism. In Study 2, I showed that children at age three are 
neutral in regards to essentialist reasoning. The same children show signs of inherent thinking, 
particularly on measures of stability. Notably, children were significantly more likely to show 
signs of inherent thought in the absence of essentialism than they were to show signs of 
essentialism in the absence of inherent thinking. In Study 3, I replicate this finding with a revised 
measure of inherent thinking and more precautions to ensure children understood the task. These 
findings provide further evidence that inherent thinking may precede essentialism. 
Understanding potential precursors to essentialist thought may be an important first step in 
uncovering the developmental origins of essentialist beliefs.  
Still, there remain a number of limitations of the research reported here. It is important to 
note that children most strongly endorsed the stability of social-conventional patterns over time, 
but had relatively neutral beliefs regarding the necessity of these social patterns as well as the 
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reasons why these patterns exist. According to the inherence heuristic account (Cimpian & 
Salomon, 2014), beliefs about stability form as a downstream consequence of inherent intuitions. 
However, it is also possible that the data reported here don’t reflect an inherence bias per se, but 
instead a bias to believe that patterns generally remain stable over time. Early in life, children 
may assume that much of their environment remains stable and unchanging, and thus come to 
assume that the world is generally structured as such. Thus, a stability assumption—rather than 
an inherence bias in explanation—may precede essentialism. However, the stability measure 
used in my studies was simpler than the other inherence measures, and could have been the only 
measure that captured any aspect of children’s intuitions. Thus, stability intuitions may derive 
from inherent thinking, but I was not able to adequately capture that possibility in the studies 
reported here.   
Another limitation of the present research is that the design heavily relied on children’s 
verbal skills, which might make it difficult to translate these measures for work with younger 
samples. In order to fully understand the developmental sources of essentialism, however, it is 
important to examine the presence of these beliefs as early in development as possible. Although 
language is not explicitly required for category learning and inference—as even prelinguistic 
infants can learn categories (Baldwin, Markman, & Melartin, 1993; Mehler & Fox; 1985)—it 
remains unknown whether essentialism, an abstract phenomenon, can be tested without 
language. Moreover, it might be even more challenging to compare other constructs to 
essentialism (e.g., the inherence heuristic) without verbal instruction. Thus, future work might 
attempt to develop, if possible, ways test the presence of essentialism using nonverbal tasks.  
Although I have provided evidence for a possible precursor to essentialism, there is still 
much to learn about the developmental course of essentialist thought. Future work may test the 
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more general claim that inherent thinking not only precedes essentialism, but also gives rise to it. 
Perhaps, inherent thinking, along with other early cognitive biases (e.g., the ability to distinguish 
appearances from reality or the tendency to search for causes) contributes to the formation of 
essentialist beliefs across development. If early signs of inherent thinking predict essentialist 
beliefs later in development, that might suggest that inherent thinking indeed lays the foundation 
for essentialist beliefs. It would be interesting to examine this possibility in a longitudinal design, 
which could track changes in individuals’ inherent thinking, as well as their essentialism, to 
understand their relationship over time across different points in development. It would also be 
interesting to examine how the different components of inherent thinking might inform the 
different components of essentialist reasoning across the lifespan. As children’s essentialist and 
inherent intuitions become more refined and sophisticated with time, we might observe 
predictive relationships across the different aspects of both constructs (for example, perhaps 
stability beliefs will be predictive of the belief in category constancy across metamorphosis). The 
data reported here cannot speak to this issue, as children’s essentialism and inherent thinking 
were not related. However, these intuitions might be related in older children (as they are in 
adults; see Salomon & Cimpian, 2014). Thus, future research may aim to understand the possible 
array of relationships between the different strands of inherent thinking and essentialism across 
different developmental time-points. 
Another unknown is the extent to which the tendency to think inherently varies by 
domain, and how such variation might be related to variation in essentialist beliefs. The bias to 
explain via inherent thinking is thought to influence a number of domains—including social-
political patterns (Hussak & Cimpian, 2015), early scientific beliefs (Horne & Cimpian, 2015), 
and intuitions about words and language (Sutherland & Cimpian, 2015). However, the extent to 
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which inherent explanations may influence reasoning in some domains more than others has not 
explicitly been examined. It would be interesting if inherent explanations pertaining to certain 
domains (e.g., social groups) influence the development of essentialist beliefs more than inherent 
thinking pertaining to other domains (e.g., man-made objects). Future work might examine these 
and other such possibilities.  
What do the findings reported here mean for the broader scope of cognitive 
development? In many ways, the study of young children’s essentialist beliefs changed the 
mindset of cognitive development as a field. Early developmental accounts painted children’s 
concepts as shallow and unsophisticated (Piaget, 1970); however, evidence of children’s ability 
to essentialize suggested that young children’s concepts must involve more than a reliance on 
perceptual features. The studies reported here support an early-competence view of children’s 
concepts in two ways. First, Study 1 found that children show signs of the belief in a causal 
essence as early as age five. This study was done with revised essentialism measures, lending 
credibility to early work done in the same vein. Second, Studies 2 and 3 provide evidence that as 
early as age three, children have informative intuitions about how the world is structured, and 
these intuitions seem to be informed by beliefs pertaining to inherence. These studies are the first 
to show that children as young as three years of age engage in inherent reasoning, and add to a 
growing body of work suggesting that biases in explanation play a formative role in children’s 
concepts (Hussak & Cimpian, 2015; Salomon & Cimpian, 2014; Tworek & Cimpian, 2016). 
Still, some might argue that young children do not have theories at all, and that their 
“competence” is the result of learning simple associations, or “dumb attentional mechanisms” 
(see the “DAM” theory; Smith, Jones, & Landau, 1996). This contrasts with the “theory theory” 
view supported by essentialism (Gelman, 2003) in how it accounts for the very nature of 
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cognitive development. According to the “DAM” theory view, children primarily use perceptual 
information to make inferences, and with repeated experience learn to make associative 
connections to inform their concepts (e.g., linguistic contexts). “DAM” theory does not assume 
that children have a built-in skeletal framework that guides concept formation, but instead that 
cognition undergoes a developmental shift from perceptual to conceptual through learning 
processes. Other accounts support similar developmental shifts. For example, Gentner and 
colleagues argue for a relational shift during development, such that children first understand 
analogy by reasoning about shared object attributes, and only later in development are they able 
to reason about relations (Gentner, 1988; Ratterman & Gentner, 1998). In a similar vein, Keil 
and Batterman (1984) suggest that children’s concepts undergo a categorical shift, such that 
young children use characteristic features to make category inferences and it’s only with age that 
they recognize the importance of defining features. 
 These accounts, including “DAM” theory, are appealing in that they provide a more 
mechanistic explanation for the developmental changes in categorization that occur during early 
childhood. In contrast, the “theory theory” view holds that cognitive development is continuous: 
children have rather sophisticated (though skeletal) concepts early on that may be shaped by 
learning and experience (Gelman, 1996; Gelman, 2003). Children certainly take into account 
perceptual features during categorization, but the theory view would maintain that children use 
this perceptual information along with information about the nonobvious (see discussion by 
Gelman & Medin, 1993).   
The present research, as well as much of the essentialism literature, suggests that children 
do have theories by at least age four—that is, they incorporate causality as well as hidden, 
nonobvious properties into their concepts. What precedes children’s theory-based concepts 
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before the preschool years? Although many researchers would maintain that children’s concepts 
are never atheoretical (e.g., Bloom, 2000), it’s certainly possible that some sort of developmental 
shift occurs before four years of age. How might the data reported here inform this possibility? It 
may seem as though inherent thinking could involve a reliance on concrete, perceptual 
properties; indeed, the explanation process does rely on salient information that likely comes to 
mind first, which in many cases, may be obvious perceptual information. Thus, if inherent 
thinking gives rise to essentialism across development, one might argue that this transition could 
be an instantiation of a perceptual to conceptual or an object to relational shift. However, the 
inherence heuristic account does not suppose that inherent information is necessarily concrete or 
perceptually obvious—inherent explanations may instead take an abstract form and even rely on 
hidden properties and their relation to patterns (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014). The data reported 
here does not necessarily speak to this issue, as children were not asked to generate their own 
explanations and the nature of the tasks used does not tell us what type of inherent information 
children might attend do (e.g., obvious or non-obvious). In order to understand how essentialism 
might derive from inherence, it may be important to examine these constructs with different 
measures and with younger samples. Doing so may help researchers understand the nature of 
cognitive development more broadly.  
 The present research may also be informative for work aimed at reducing the downsides 
to essentialist thought. The widespread belief that social categories possess “essences” leads 
children and adults to exaggerate within-category homogeneity, and as a result, endorse 
stereotypes for many social groups (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Levy & 
Dweck, 1999; Martin & Parker, 1995; Pauker, Ambady, & Apfelbaum, 2010; Plaks, Stroessner, 
Dweck, & Sherman, 2001; Prentice & Miller, 2007). Essentialism also makes people more likely 
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to attribute group differences (e.g., more men working in computer science than women) to 
natural, biological causes (e.g., men are more intellectually gifted than women) as opposed to 
social or cultural factors (e.g., bias against women in STEM fields) (Leslie, in press; Martin & 
Parker, 1995; Salomon & Cimpian, 2014). These and other similar attributions make people 
more likely to justify the status quo and accept social inequalities (e.g., men being paid more in 
computer science than women) (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014; Hussak & Cimpian, 2015; Jayaratne 
et al., 2006). Thus, studying the origins of essentialist thought might help us to better understand 
how these incorrect and harmful beliefs are formed, and how they may be effectively prevented.  
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APPENDIX A: STUDY MATERIALS 
 
INNATE POTENTIAL (STUDIES 1-3) 
This seed came from an [orange/lemon/rose]. A girl named Jennifer took this seed out of the 
orange. Then she planted the seed in a [flower pot/ cornfield/vegetable garden]. See, here’s the 
[flower pot/cornfield/vegetable garden]. Now I’m going to ask you some questions.  
 
So where did the seed come from? And where did [Jennifer/Ashley/Lauren] plant this seed?  
 
When that seed grew, what popped up out of the ground, was it an orange tree or a flower? 
 
Orange	  Seed	   Lemon	  Seed	   Rose	  Seed	  
Flower	  Pot	   Cornfield	   Vegetable	  Garden	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“FEPPY INTRODUCTION” (STUDIES 1-3) 
 
“This is Feppy. Feppy is a visitor from a place far far away where they do lots of things 
differently than we do. Some of the things they do are wrong, but some of the things are just 
different. 
 
These are Feppy's friends. 
 
Your job is to help me figure out when Feppy and his friends say something wrong and when 
Feppy and his friends say something that is maybe right, but just different.” 
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METAMORPHOSIS (STUDIES 1-3) 
 
Animals: 
 
Here is a baby [Dax/Frip]. [Daxes/Frips] are animals. And this is a baby [Dax/Frip]. Here is 
another picture.  Let’s see what Feppy says about this new picture.  
 
 Feppy and his friends ALL say that this is what [Daxes/Frips] look like when they are adults.  
 
Are they maybe right? [Yes/ No] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baby Dax Adult Dax 
Baby Frip Adult Frip 
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Tools: 
 
Here is a brand new [Blick /Joop]. [Blicks/Joops] are tools. And this is a brand new 
[Blick/Joops] (point again). Here is another picture. Let’s see what Feppy says about this new 
picture. 
 
Feppy and his friends ALL say that this is what [Blicks/Joops] look like after they have been 
used for a while.  
 
Are they maybe right? [Yes/ No] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New Blick Used Blick 
New Joop Used Joop 
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BOUNDARIES (STUDIES 1-3) 
 
Here are a couple of things. Let’s see what Feppy says about them. Feppy and his friends ALL 
say that these are the same kind of thing.  
 
Are they maybe right? [Yes/ No] 
 
Animal pairs: 
 
Artifact pairs:  
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INHERENT THINKING MEASURE (STUDIES 2 & 3) 
 
Using the “birthday cakes have candles” fact: 
 
Stability: 
 
Question 1a: Do you think birthday cakes have always had candles, even way back when 
the first ever birthday cake was made? Have birthday cakes always had candles?  
 
Question 1b: Do you think birthday cakes will always have candles, even way into the 
future, when the very last birthday cake is made? Will birthday cakes always have 
candles?  
 
 Scoring: 0 = “no”, 1 = “yes” 
 
 
Changeability: 
 
Question 2: Imagine if people wanted birthday cakes to not have candles, and everyone 
agreed that they wanted birthday cakes to not have candles. Would it be okay to make 
this change? Would it be okay to make a change so that birthday cakes do not have 
candles? 
 
Children could respond with “yes” or “no.” If they responded with “no,” the 
experimenter asked a follow-up: 
 
Would it be sort of not okay, not okay, or really not okay to make a change so that 
birthday cakes don’t have candles?  
 
Scoring: 4-point scale (1 = “okay” to 4 = “really not okay”) 
  
Explanation: 
 
Okay, so I was talking to some friends about why birthday cakes have candles.  
Here are two reasons that my friends came up with. I wanted to know what you think of 
these reasons… 
 
Ok, so one person said that birthday cakes have candles…. 
 
Question 3 [EXTRINSIC]: … just because people thought it might be a nice idea. But 
birthday cakes don’t really have to have candles. 
  
Is this person right or not right to think that birthday cakes have candles just because 
people thought it might be a nice idea? * 
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[Question 3 [INHERENT]: …just because they are birthday cakes. And birthday cakes 
have to have candles.  
 
Is this person right [point] or not right [point] to think that birthday cakes have candles 
just because they're birthday cakes?  
 
Children could respond with “right” or “not right.” The experimenter followed-up with 
a scale for each response.  
 
Scoring: 4-point scale (1 = “really not right” to 4 = “really right”) 
* Indicates reversed scoring 
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BOUNDARIES/METAMORPHOSIS CATCH QUESTIONS (STUDY 1 & 2) 
 
1. Feppy and his friends ALL say that baseball is a sport. Are they maybe right? [Yes/ No] 
 
2. Feppy and his friends ALL say that your name is Sammy. Are they maybe right? [Yes/No] 
 
 
BOUNDARIES/METAMORPHOSIS CATCH QUESTIONS (STUDY 3) 
 
 
1. Feppy and his friends ALL say that kids go to school. Are they maybe right? [Yes/ No] 
 
2. Feppy and his friends ALL say that trees can talk. Are they maybe right? [Yes/ No] 
 
3. Feppy and his friends ALL say that some people like ice-cream. Are they maybe right? [Yes/ 
No] 
4. Feppy and his friends ALL say that dogs have wings. Are they maybe right? [Yes/ No] 
 
 
INNATE POTENTIAL CATCH QUESTION (STUDY 3) 
 
This seed came from a pumpkin. A girl named Katie took this seed out of the pumpkin. Then 
she planted the seed in a pumpkin patch. See, here’s the pumpkin patch. Now I’m going to 
ask you some questions.  
So where did the seed come from? And where did Katie plant this seed?  
When the seed from the pumpkin grew, what popped up out of the pumpkin patch, was it a 
pumpkin plant or a tomato plant? 
 
 
INHERENT THINKING CATCH QUESTIONS (STUDY 3) 
 
1. You know how the sun is hot, right? The sun is hot. Do you think the sun has always been hot, 
even way back when the sun shone for the first time? Has the sun always been hot? [Yes/No] 
 
2. You know how you’re 3-years-old, right? You’re three! Do you think you will always be 
three, even way into the future, when you’re all grown up? Will you always be three? [Yes/No] 
 
3. You know how the sky is up, right? The sky is up. Do you think the sky has always been up, 
even way back when people first saw the sky? Has the sky always been up? [Yes/No] 
 
4. You know how you’re sitting in that chair, right? You’re sitting in that chair! Do you think 
you will always be sitting in that chair, even way into the future, when you’re at home and not 
here anymore? Will you always be sitting in that chair? [Yes/No]  
